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ABSTRACT
Copyright, it is commonly said, matters in society because it encourages
the production of socially beneficial, culturally significant expressive
content. Our focus on copyright's recent history, however, blinds us to the
social information practices that have always existed. In this Article, we
examine these social information practices, and query copyright's role
within them. We posit a functional model of what is necessary for creative
content to move from creator to user. These are the functions dealing
with the creation, selection, production, dissemination, promotion, sale,
and use of expressive content. We demonstrate how centralized commer-
cial control of information content has been the driving force behind
copyright's expansion. All of the functions that copyright industries once
controlled, however, are undergoing revolutionary decentralization and
disintermediation. Different aspects of information technology, notably the
digitization of information, widespread computer ownership, the rise of the
Internet, and the development of social software, threaten the viability and
desirability of centralized control over every one of the content functions.
These functions are increasingly being performed by individuals and
disaggregated groups. This raises an issue for copyright as the main
regulatory force in information practices: copyright assumes a central
control requirement that no longer applies for the development of
expressive content. We examine the normative implications of this shift for
our information policy in this new post-copyright era. Most notably, we
conclude that copyright law needs to be adjusted in order to recognize the
opportunity and desirability of decentralized content, and the expanded
marketplace of ideas it promises.
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright law today is like Rome at the height of its Empire.'
Rome was once the center of the world, and the Roman Empire
stretched from Syria to Britain, practically to the limits of the
imagination. Over the course of centuries, Rome had expanded its
borders until it influenced a vast multitude of diverse societies.
Roman control lasted for centuries, but eventually Rome fell when
the barbaric Visigoths stormed Rome's gates in 410 A.D. Many
surely saw the sack of Rome as the end of culture and civilization,
yet one could also frame it not as a fall, but as a transformation.
Rome's empire became a less unified set of social groups, states, and
governments.
Like the Roman Empire, copyright's legal empire has expanded
aggressively in the last few centuries and it now dominates a vast
terrain of social information practices. From relatively humble
origins in regulating book-printing monopolies, copyright has
grown to encompass a range of activities involving the production,
reproduction, distribution, and use of information.2 Yet copyright
remains by and large imperial. Copyright specialists and stake-
holders, not the public, have been responsible for the historic shape
and enforcement of copyright laws, and these laws have grown to be
largely inscrutable to the greater public. The citizenry, in the view
of copyright's shareholders, are merely passive beneficiaries of
copyright's regime, and are described as "readers," "viewers," and/or
"consumers" of content, the product that copyright specialists create.
The fact that the greater populace has had little reliable knowledge
of copyright law has not been overly significant-the public has not
been understood as part of content-production processes.3
Like the Roman Empire before it, copyright finds itself today
under threat from its borders. The former subjects of copyright are
increasingly aware that they are being taxed by copyright, but they
have only a vague notion of how allegiance to copyright benefits
1. Roman law, we feel obliged to note, did not recognize anything like copyright. Paul
Edward Geller, Copyright History and the Future: What's Culture Got to Do with It?, 47 J.
COPYRIGHT SOCY 209, 213-14 (2000).
2. See id. at 215-35.
3. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 402
(2003) (identifying this as the "couch potato" understanding of the copyright consumer).
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them. This change in the status quo is largely attributable to the
fact that copyright's formerly passive consumer is increasingly an
active participant in content-production processes. The average
citizen now feels copyright law intruding on her personal informa-
tion practices. Part of this friction is due to technological changes,
but part of it is also attributable to copyright's extraordinary scope.
The two, as we discuss below, are indeed closely related. Whatever
the root of the current friction, it is true that the populace today,
more than at any time previously, is a player in the copyright
process. The public is creating, selecting, distributing, and recasting
information, and is increasingly being policed and monitored
pursuant to copyright laws.4 Our goal in this Article is to describe
how copyright's former consumers are now the creators, producers,
and disseminators of content, and to puzzle out what this might
mean for our system of copyright.
As an initial matter, we should explain our terms. Many copy-
right scholars, including the authors, have spoken of copyright
"consumers" engaged in the consumption of information "content."'
It may be more appropriate to say that information consumes us,
not vice versa. Advertisements, publications, television programs,
music, books, movies, websites, and radio broadcasts surround us
and compete for our time and attention. Our time, not the informa-
tion that assails us, is the primary expendable good in this process.
The consumer is thus the consumed.
The term "consumer" is correct insofar as it points to the fact that
payments are regularly made for books, movies, and music as
physical products. It also tends, to some degree, however, to conflate
these products with information in misleading ways.6 Copyright is
4. CompareJESSICALITMAN, DIGITALCOPYRIGHT 18-19(2001) ("[Tiraditionally, copyright
owners have had control over the sorts of uses typically made by commercial and institutional
actors and little control over the consumptive uses made by individuals.... Most copyright
infringement suits proceeded against businesses and institutions.") with Liu, supra note 3,
at 406-21 (describing the new "active consumer" model and noting that consumer
relationships to copyrighted works are more complex than they had been in the past).
5. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative Destruction: Fair Use
Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539, 566 (2003); F. Gregory Lastowka, Free
Access and the Future of Copyright, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293, 295 (2001); Liu,
supra note 3, at 424; Tim Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 62, on file with authors).
6. See Liu, supra note 3, at 400-01. Professor Liu clearly recognizes this inherent
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essentially a law regulating information practices, not a law about
manufacturing tangible products. Specialists manufacture most
consumer products. Expressive representation and communication,
on the other hand, is something fundamental to human nature.
Cars consume gasoline and people consume food, but the informa-
tion that is the subject of copyright can never be consumed.' After
a book is read, the information remains. As all concede, intellectual
property is, in economic terms, a public good. We will avoid talking
about the consumption of information content, therefore, because
this creates a serious potential for confusion and demeans the role
that the public plays in creating the universe of expressive content.8
Instead of a model of content that proposes manufacturers and
consumers, we want to look at the creation of content as a feature
of human expressive activity. The amount of copyright-protected
information available to the average individual today is stagger-
ing, and, surprisingly, copyright law has little to do with this
development. For instance, the majority of Americans today have a
computer that gives them regular access to the information
phenomenon known as the World Wide Web. The Web is largely an
amateur information-sharing project. A recent Pew Internet study
on the creation of online content by individuals found that more
than fifty-three million American adults have uploaded works to the
Internet, including writings, art, video, and audio creations.9 We
difficulty with the term "consumer," though he chooses to rehabilitate the term's connotations
rather than abandon the term in favor of a new one.
7. See Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development
of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOCY 113, 115 (2003) (describing
the diminishing importance of physical "copies" to copyright law); Richard A. Posner,
Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 Hous. L. REV. 621, 622-24 (2003).
8. This demeaning view of the public is, perhaps, best summarized by a "new media"
character in William Gibson's Idoru who sees content-consumers as:
[A] vicious, lazy, profoundly ignorant, perpetually hungry organism craving the
warm god-flesh of the anointed. Personally I like to imagine something the size
of a baby hippo, the color of a week-old boiled potato, that lives by itself, in the
dark, in a double-wide on the outskirts of Topeka. It's covered with eyes and
sweats constantly. The sweat runs into those eyes and makes them sting. It has
no mouth, ... no genitals, and can only express its mute extremes of murderous
rage and infantile desire by changing the channels on a universal remote.
WILLIAM GIBSON, IDORU 28-29 (1996).
9. Amanda Lenhart et al., Pew Internet & American Life Project, Content Creation
Online 2 (Feb. 29, 2004), available at: http://www.pewinternet.orglpdfs/PIPContent-
CreationReport.pdf.
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therefore use "amateur-to-amateur" in the title of this Article to
describe the social phenomenon of popular information creation and
free distribution."° The participants are amateurs, by our definition,
because they lack financial and proprietary motives." The audi-
ences are also amateurs because they are generally not financially
motivated or interested in paying for the information that other
amateurs create. They often build upon, copy, select, and re-
transmit the original information without performing the contrac-
tual negotiations that copyright law expects.
A leading example of such amateur participation in copyright
processes is the social phenomenon of weblogs, or "blogs": regularly
updated and freely accessible Internet-based writings. The Pew
survey indicated that between two and seven percent of U.S.
Internet users had created weblogs by 2004.12 Weblogs are clearly
protected by copyright 3 and often link to other weblogs or docu-
ments available on the Internet. Millions of people write and read
weblogs every day, and during the past few years, weblogs have
become a regular source of popular news, information, and commen-
tary.14 Weblogs are thus displacing, at least to some degree, the
information and communication space previously occupied by
traditional media such as television, radio, and newspapers. 5 Yet
those who write weblogs are clearly not acting in accord with a
theory of copyright as a required incentive for content production.
10. In suggesting the term "amateur-to-amateur" we also allude to the role that "peer-to-
peer" technologies play in connecting the amateurs within the content sphere.
11. The Latin root of "amateur" is love, which perhaps captures best the motivation for
amateur efforts. For other formulations describing the same general category of information
producer/distributors, see Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political
Economy of Information, 52 DuKE L.J. 1245, 1246 (2003) [hereinafter Benkler, Freedom in the
Commons] ("nonmarket"); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction
of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 45 (2003) ("volunteers"); Lastowka,
supra note 5, at 302 ("altruists"); Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and
the Death of Copyright, FIRST MONDAY (describing "Anarchism as a Mode of Production"), at
http://moglen.law.columbia.edu/ publications/anarchism.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
12. Lenhart et al., supra note 9, at 5.
13. See Attiya Malik, Are You Content with the Content? Intellectual Property Implications
of Weblog Publishing, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 439, 477 (2003).
14. See Lenhart et al., supra note 9, at 4-5.
15. Indeed, as we discuss below, newspapers are increasingly being built using social
practices that operate in tension with copyright's system. See, e.g., Daniel Terdiman, Open
Arms for Open-Source News, WIRED NEWS (July 22, 2004) (examining the growing open source
movement in newspapers), at http://www.wired.com/news/ culture/0,1284,64285,00.html.
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In this Article, we examine how the amateur-to-amateur trend in
information practices calls into question copyright's claim to a
central role in structuring our information environment. Part I
explains the close relationship between copyright and technology.
We explain how copyrighted content is essentially a subspecies of
communicable information. Historically, the use of certain record-
ing technologies, such as books, films, and sound recordings, has
divided the general realms of information and communication
from the realm of information protected by copyright. As we observe,
however, this line is becoming blurred. Second, we explain how the
centrality of fixation to copyright law has inevitably led, through
technological advances, to an ever-increasing scope of copyright
protections for new varieties of recorded information. Third, we
describe how distributed network technologies are inherently
problematic from the standpoint of theorizing and enforcing
copyright law. As John Perry Barlow observed roughly a decade ago,
peer-to-peer technologies, like the Internet, are a substantially
different type of information technology.16
Part II analyzes the current impact of emerging digital and
network technologies on copyright law's claim to prominence in
social information practices. Historically, copyright has facilitated
information distribution by way of centralized and integrated
models of creation and distribution. We posit that seven processes
have traditionally been chained together in this model: creation,
selection, production, dissemination, promotion, purchase, and use.
Until recently, all seven functions were conjoined out of necessity,
and were under the control of centralized intermediaries. Only
profitable works could be produced and distributed, and these works
were primarily controlled by integrated business operations that
took an intense interest in protecting their business models through
copyright laws. Part II contrasts this past model of centralization
and profit-focus with the present moment, in which the information
practices affected by copyright are increasingly non-professional,
socially distributed, and disintermediated."7
16. John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas, WIRED, Mar. 1994, at 84, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas-pr.html.
17. Benkler, Freedom in the Commons, supra note 11, at 1250.
2004] 957
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Part III draws some conclusions from our theoretical and
descriptive accounts of amateur-to-amateur practices. It is clear
that two parallel spheres of information production exist today. One
is a traditional, copyright-based and profit-driven model that is
struggling with technological change. The second is a newly
enabled, decentralized amateur production sphere, in which
individual authors or small groups freely release their work to other
amateurs for experience, redistribution, and/or transformation. If,
as we argue, the amateur sphere of content production is today
providing the public benefits that were previously provided
exclusively by the mechanisms of copyright law, we should change
copyright law to better facilitate the particular benefits that
amateur content production provides. At the very least, we should
do our best to prevent attempts by the copyright incumbents to
destroy the emergence of amateur-to-amateur content development
as a viable alternative.
I. COPYRIGHT AND INFORMATION POLICY
In order to understand the effects of the amateur-to-amateur
technological change on copyright, it is important to understand
and review the current scope of copyright. Copyright is essentially
a law that creates a property interest in communicative expres-
sion. Under the federal law of the United States, copyright interests
obtain only when communications are fixed in a tangible medium. 8
In the last two centuries, fixation technologies have proliferated,
resulting in an ever-increasing quantity of communications
governed by copyright.' 9
Below, we explain how new information-capture technologies
have led to increased copyright protections. The most significant
historical change, for the purposes of copyright, has been the rise of
distributed information networks. The Internet has enabled a vast
environment of universally accessible captured and crafted informa-
tion that is created and freely distributed largely by amateurs. By
18. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works ... fixed
in any tangible medium of expression ....").
19. See Jordan M. Blanke, Vncent van Gogh, "Sweat of the Brow," and Database
Protection, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 645, 650-51 (2002).
[Vol. 46:951958
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making the technologies of fixation and copying transparent and
meaningless to the user, the Internet represents the culmination of
the technological expansion of copyright. Technologically fixed
copies have been removed from their privileged status and have
become part of the processes of conversation.
A. Copyright's Theory of Information
"Information," broadly speaking, is data that can be subject to
perception, recording, or transmission.2" Almost all of perceptible
reality can be communicable information, although communicable
information need not always constitute the representation of any
other pattern.21 Copyright law regulates the transmission of a
subset of information.22 It is not the only area of law that governs
information practices. For instance, securities laws, privacy laws,
defamation laws, rights of publicity, and the laws of blackmail and
unfair competition all regulate information practices. 23 Copyright's
regulation of information practices, however, is more fundamental
and considerably more expansive.
Copyright concerns itself with original works of authorship. This
generally excludes information that lacks human origination.24 For
example, when William Wordsworth revisited the banks of the Wye
a few miles above Tintern Abbey and experienced the sounds of
waters rolling from their mountain springs, the sight of steep and
lofty cliffs, and the plots of cottage ground and orchard tufts clad in
20. See Robert A. Heverly, The Information Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127,
1147-51, 1159 (2003) (discussing an appropriate definition of information in the context of
property law).
21. Id. at 1149 ("[Information] need not be tangible, but might be a sound, a gesture, or
even a momentarily existing arrangement of clouds; each of these has the potential to convey
meaning.").
22. See Alan L. Durham, Copyright and Information Theory: Toward an Alternative Model
of 'Authorship," 2004 BYU L. REV. 69, 93 & n.116; cf. Paul Edward Geller, Toward an
Overriding Norm in Copyright: Sign Wealth, 159 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR
3, 51-57 (1994) (discussing copyright works as "global signs").
23. See generally James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens,
Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (1992) (exploring law's regulation of
information practices in four realms: copyright, genetic information, blackmail, and insider
trading); see also Heverly, supra note 20, at 1156-57 & n.126.
24. See Alan L. Durham, The Random Muse: Authorship and Indeterminacy, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 569, 571 (2002).
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one green hue, none of that raw sensory information input was then,
or is now, within the purview of copyright law.2 5 Non-communicative
information patterns of human origin are also excluded from
copyright protection.26 For instance, the arrangement of cars in
traffic, the shapes of piles of asphalt, the lines painted on highways,
and the arrangements of discarded boxes in a trash can are all
human-created and perceptible patterns that can be captured and
conveyed as visual information; but generally, this information is
not subject to copyright protection."
Copyright law views naturally originating information patterns
as "facts." Human-originating information patterns may also be
regarded as "facts" to the extent they are not intended to be
communicative.28 For example, the information pattern created by
discarded boxes in a trash can is generally regarded as a visual
"fact" not subject to copyright protection.29 On the other hand, if a
well-known avant garde visual artist arranged the very same
discarded boxes in an art gallery in the very same way, the arrange-
ment of boxes would be protected by copyright.3" As another
interesting comparison, the splatter patterns on a house painter's
drop cloth are facts generally not protected by copyright; yet
25. WILLIAM WORDSWORTH & SAMUELT. COLERIDGE, LYRICALBALLADS 113-18 (R.L. Brett
& A.R. Jones eds., Methuen & Co. 1968) (1798).
26. See Durham, supra note 24, at 635.
27. See id.; David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls:Authorship and Originality,
38 Hous. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2001).
28. See Durham, supra note 24, at 635; Nimmer, supra note 27, at 20-21.
29. Copyright scholars have debated whether the "intent to be an author" is a primary
component in copyright's conception of authorship; though it seems somewhat tautological,
it does provide a rough answer for many of the major puzzles of copyright authorship.
Compare Geller, supra note 22, at 59-61 (discussing the distinction between mere scriveners
and authorial writers), Jane C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative
Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063, 1085-88 (2003) (suggesting "intent to be an author"
is one of five principles of authorship), and Nimmer, supra note 27, at 204-07 (arguing that
authorial intent is necessary for copyright protection) with Durham, supra note 24 at 642 &
n.385 (discussing whether one might, as an act of authorship, "adopt" a pile of garbage).
30. Nimmer, supra note 27, at 205-07.
Christu, the magnificent performance artist, decides to go the field of
"readymades" one better: he buys a Barbie doll, smashes it with a hammer,
perches it amidst banana peels and other household garbage, and displays the
product at the newly refurbished Tate Gallery. Has a derivative work been
created? It would seem so.
Id. at 206 (footnotes omitted).
960
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Jackson Pollock's action paintings, which bear some resemblance to
splattered drop cloths, are protected by copyright.31 Although the
pairs of paint splatters and boxes may be practically indistinguish-
able, copyright views the difference between them as the difference
between fact and expression. No court has offered a convincing
epistemological explanation of this distinction, and there probably
is not one to be found." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
declared the fact/expression dichotomy to be "[tihe most fundamen-
tal axiom of copyright law."3 Moreover, because the Supreme Court
has spoken, this essentially untenable theoretical distinction is
indeed the most fundamental axiom of copyright law today.
Within the field of human communicative "expression" as opposed
to "fact," copyright is generally cabined to gestalt work objects
segregated from the endless stream of human communicative
activity by, for example, the four corners of a picture frame, the
contents of a single document file, or the first and last pages of a
novel.34 Artistry, although often associated with public percep-
tions of copyright, is not a requirement of copyright.3" Arguably,
some amount of expressive "originality" is required for copyright
31. See Durham, supra note 24, at 573, 596-607, 624-27. If the painter decided to "adopt"
the drop cloth as a work of expression, it is likely that a copyright registration would be
granted, though it is not clear how a court would rule regarding the validity of the copyright.
See, e.g., Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that the
random assignation of serial numbers to machine parts was insufficient to qualify as an
instance of authorship); see also Durham, supra note 24, at 589-92 (discussing Toro).
32. Copyright scholars are generally skeptical of the theoretical integrity of the
fact/expression dichotomy. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 11, at 39 (stating that "the commons
of facts ... is being enclosed"); Jane Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A
Comment on the Scope of Copyright Protection in Works of History after Hoehling v. Universal
City Studios, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 647, 657-66 (1982); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain,
39 EMORY L.J. 965, 996 (1990) (commenting on Ginsburg's criticism of the "Platonic fact
precept"). Unless the Supreme Court arrives at some new solution to reconciling copyright
with the freedom to speak about "facts," however, the fact/expression dichotomy will remain
legally real and one must speak of "facts" as a category conceptually independent of
expression.
33. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1990).
34. Durham, supra note 24, at 635. Additionally, in the United States at least, copyright
does not encompass the expressive designs of, for instance, clothing, automobiles, masks, and
bicycle racks, because the functional nature of these objects dictates the information patterns
they convey. See id. at 641.
35. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); see generally Alfred
C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247 (1998) (articulating
how current copyright jurisprudence ignores aesthetics).
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protection to subsist. Yet the concept of originality in copyright
law is about as clear as the fact/expression dichotomy. In Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,36 the Supreme
Court ruled that a set of alphabetical phonebook listings was not
protected by copyright law because it lacked originality. Justice
O'Connor stated that originality consists of the demonstration of a
"creative spark," that could nevertheless be "crude, humble or
obvious."37 She found that the alphabetical arrangement of names
in a phonebook was "entirely typical," "garden-variety," and "devoid
of even the slightest trace of creativity," and therefore lacking in
originality.3"
Appellate decisions since Feist, however, have found the requisite
"humble" and "obvious" sparks occurring in largely quotidian acts
of selection and mark making.39 In the most extreme formulation,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit famously
suggested, in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., that
originality may be the result of "bad eyesight or defective muscula-
ture."4 The Alfred Bell opinion is still cited by courts as authorita-
tive with regard to copyright's originality requirement.41
An obvious example of copyright's solicitude for quotidian
information capture is the copyright protection of photography.
Since Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,42 decided in 1884,
courts have regularly found photographic images to meet the
requirements for copyright protection despite the fact that photo-
36. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
37. Id. at 345 (quoting 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 1.08[C][11 (1990)).
38. Id. at 362-63.
39. See, e.g., Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding the
requisite originality in an advertisement photograph of a blue vodka bottle); American Dental
Ass'n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass'n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding originality in a
taxonomy of dental procedures). An outer limit does exist. See Bridgeman Art Library v. Corel
Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that photographs that "slavishly" copy
public domain paintings are not subject to copyright); Mitch Tuchman, Inauthentic Works of
Art: Why Bridgeman May Ultimately Be Irrelevant to Art Museums, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 287, 304-05 (2001) (explaining how the Feist opinion generally left the legal definition
of originality unclear).
40. 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951); see also Litman, supra note 32, at 1009-10 (comparing
the Romantic conception of the author with the conception of the author set forth in the Alfred
Bell opinion).
41. See Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg., 365 F.3d 133, 135 (2d Cir. 2004).
42. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
[Vol. 46:951
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graphs capture indisputably "factual" patterns of light.43 Although
the Supreme Court in Burrow-Giles discussed the work of the
photographer in creating the scene that was photographed- posing
and arranging the subject 44-the rationale for the protection of
photography today is simply that photographs demonstrate
selection and personal influence through temporal and spatial
framing. The photographer stands here, not there; the camera is
pointed this way, not that way; the photograph is taken at one time,
not another; and the photographer chooses a certain stock of film. 45
Of course, any given photograph must demonstrate this kind of
selection and influence, even if the intent of the photographer is
simply to capture factual information, not to express an artistic
vision. Selection is inherent in the technology; one cannot take a
picture of everything. The result is that if a putative author today
buys a random digital camera, closes her eyes, and snaps a random
set of digital photographs on the banks of the River Wye, she can be
reasonably assured that she owns the copyright in the photographic
works she has created,46 though perhaps she would be wise not to
disclose her artistic technique.4"
There are limits to the scope of copyright protections for photo-
graphic works. For instance, the River Wye as a "fact," will remain
an available subject to be sampled or coded by a future author, just
as a poem about the River Wye does not completely preclude future
poems about the River Wye. A second photographer, however, might
wish to be more cautious because the scope of copyright protection
goes a little bit further than exact reproduction. The first photogra-
pher of the Wye can bring suit against the subsequent photogra-
43. EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 136-39 (2000).
44. Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60; Tuchman, supra note 39, at 295-99 (recounting the
history of Burrow-Giles).
45. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 141-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Jewelers'
Circular Publ'g Co. v. Keystone Publ'g Co., 274 F. 932,934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), ("[Nlo photograph,
however simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence of the author, and no two will be
absolutely alike."), aff'd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922); Tuchman, supra note 39, at 290-311
(discussing the evolution of legal treatment of photographic creativity).
46. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 29, at 1074 (stating that copyright vaunts "mind over
machine").
47. See Tuchman, supra note 39, at 299. Tuchman's fascinating article notes how the
analysis in photographic copyright cases shifted during the twentieth century from an interest
in the photographer's labors of artistic production to an analysis of the photographic image
as an independent object of study. See id. at 301.
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pher, alleging that the second attempted to replicate the first's
protected expression. 8 If this were the case, the subsequent
photographer may be found to have infringed upon the copyright of
the first photographer. If one thinks the River Wye should be a
subject completely free to all future photographers, this obviously
presents some practical problems in the application of copyright to
supposedly factual information patterns because there are only a
limited number of ways the River Wye can be photographed.4 9
Our point in this section is simply to highlight the broad net that
copyright casts over information recording and communication
practices. Today, copyright can be extended to a vast field of
information, including almost any recorded and aggregated pattern
of marks, symbols, signals, or other representational activity.5 °
Indeed, most of us infringe copyright laws as a matter of course in
our information-saturated society. Our children infringe copyrights
long before they are sued by the RIAA for downloading Eminem
songs: they sing "Happy Birthday" at public gatherings;" they
finger-paint pictures of Mickey Mouse;52 they read Winnie-the-Pooh
books aloud;53 and they dress up their Barbie dolls and take
pictures.54 All of these activities entail replicating or transforming
48. See SAMUELS, supra note 43, at 160-62.
49. See id. at 159-62. "[Clopyright in a photograph can be infringed not only when it is
mechanically and precisely reproduced; it can also be infringed when other people reproduce
substantially similar works using their own cameras." Id. at 162.
This was essentially the situation that led to protracted litigation in Ets-Hokin v. Skyy
Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2003), where both plaintiff and defendant had
photographed the same bottle. The Ninth Circuit stated, "[t]his long-running litigation is
fundamentally about how many ways one can create an advertising photograph ... of a blue
vodka bottle. We conclude there are not very many." Id. at 764. The Ninth Circuit therefore
required that the plaintiff's copyright would be limited to the prohibition of only "virtually
identical" photographs of the bottle. Id.
50. Nimmer, supra note 27, at 184 (noting "the innumerable notes, memoranda, doodlings,
sketches, and other effluvia that flood the theoretical portholes for federal copyright
protection").
51. See Marvin Ammori, Note, The Uneasy Case for Copyright Extension, 16 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 287, 293 & n.35 (2002).
52. See id. at 293.
53. This would infringe Disney's right to "perform" its literary works. See 17 U.S.C. §
106(4) (2000). The current statute was written broadly to expressly include such "not-for-
profit" readings within its scope. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 448-49 & n.32 (1984) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976)).
54. See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common
Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651 (1997) (arguing that such actions would constitute
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certain information patterns in violation of copyright law. These
infringing childhood activities will probably not trigger cease-and-
desist letters, but as a formal legal matter, they are indeed copy-
right violations.55
As Jessica Litman noted in 1996, "more than ever before, our
copyright policy is becoming our information policy." 6 Clearly seeing
the breadth of copyright's putative control over social information
practices is an essential step in understanding the increasing
importance of amateur content. If one thinks of copyright exclu-
sively in terms of the most popular music, the biggest paperback
bestsellers, and summer blockbuster movies, one may be inclined
to dismiss or deny the importance of efforts of individuals who are
not copyright "professionals." If one understands that copyright
protections apply to email, blogs, and digital photographs, however,
it is easy to see that copyright amateurs far outnumber copyright
professionals today.57
B. Copyright Creation and Technologies of Fixation
At a moment when changes in technology are being blamed for
the weakening of copyright law, it is important to remember that
changes in technology gave rise to copyright law in the first place.
Information patterns and communicative activities have always
been part of human culture, but copyright law has only been with
us for the last few centuries. When the primary technologies of
fixation were pen, ink, and parchment, copyright law did not exist.58
copyright infringement under current law).
55. Equitable "fair use" defenses, partially codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107, would probably
apply to all of these, but fair use is simply a defense in an infringement suit, applicable where
a finding of infringement has already been reached. Young children are not categorically
immune to copyright infringement charges, it should be noted. The American Society of
Composers and Performers famously forced the Girl Scouts to settle a lawsuit for copyright
infringement through the singing of campfire songs. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of
Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
87 VA. L. REV. 813,822 & n.28 (2001); Jonathan Zittrain, The Copyright Cage, LEGALAFFAIRS,
July/Aug. 2003, at 26, 29.
56. Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to
Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 237, 251 (1996).
57. Nimmer, supra note 27, at 185 (describing the animating myth of copyright as "the
Reality of the Pedestrian Scribbler").
58. See SAMUELS, supra note 43, at 11-13; Geller, supra note 1, at 210-19 (offering an
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The thing that spurred copyright into existence was a new technol-
ogy: the printing press. The history of copyright is inextricably
intertwined with the history of technology.59
Copyright began with the regulation of book printing. The
invention of the printing press created tremendous social revolu-
tions in the sixteenth century and paved the way for the Enlighten-
ment.6" The ruling caste's reaction to this change in information
technology, however, was not delight or the immediate birth of
copyright law; it was the institution of state censorship laws. In
England, fear of the political effects of the unregulated press gave
rise to the Stationers' Company, a state-sponsored publishing
cartel. 1 Of course, even in the sixteenth century, it was difficult to
maintain the status quo in light of new technologies, and the
Crown's initial attempts to control peer-to-peer book printing
practices gave way to intense criticism of the Stationers' Company
monopoly over information distribution. The result was a new
statute that granted a relaxation of information regulation. The
Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710, is often described as the statute
that gave birth to modern copyright. In context, however, the
statute was actually an endorsement of a more democratic use of
technology, and a repeal and abolishment of state censorship and
publisher monopolies."
Though technologies of fixation have changed substantially
since the days of the Stationers' Company, they remain central to
copyright. New technologies of fixation have steadily resulted in
historical account of the pre-copyright era). Samuels's book contains a wealth of delightful
anecdotes about copyright and various technologies. A version is currently available for free
downloading on the World Wide Web at http://www.edwardsamuels.com/illustratedstory/
index.htm.
59. See SAMUELS, supra note 43, at 9-124 (discussing the historical relationship between
copyright and technology). For an enlightening historical account of the interplay of
technologies of recording and the legalities of musical performance and ownership, see
Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came to View Musical Expression
as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
60. See Brian A. Carlson, Comment, Balancing the Digital Scales of Copyright Law, 50
SMU L. REV. 825, 828 (1997).
61. See id.
62. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 85-94 (2004) (discussing the effects
of the Statute of Anne), available at www.free.culture.ccfreeculture.pdf; see also Carlson,
supra note 60, at 828; Lunney, supra note 55, at 817-18.
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new varieties of copyright: photography, music recordings, and
computer programs.6" Today, there really is no limit to the genres of
technological fixation protected by copyright.'
Most importantly for our purposes, technology is inextricably
intertwined with the initial creation of any copyright interest. In
order for a work to exist at all for the purpose of copyright law, it
must be "fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 5 Fixation is
thus essential to copyright. Fixation introduces technology into the
equation of copyright at the very moment of creation by requiring a
tangible physical substrate to carry information patterns and some
method for fixing information patterns upon that substrate. For
example, federal copyright law does not protect creative bedtime
stories, because it does not protect the spoken, but unrecorded,
word.66 Federal copyright law does, on the other hand, protect
quotidian communications, such as digital photographs as dis-
cussed above, doodles, and business memoranda, as students at
Swarthmore recently discovered. 7 One might thus argue that
63. See S. REP. No. 94-473 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at S1 (1976) [hereinafter 1976
Reports]:
[S]cientific discoveries and technological developments have made possible new
forms of creative expression that never existed before. In some of these cases the
new expressive forms--electronic music, filmstrips, and computer programs, for
example--could be regarded as an extension of copyrightable subject matter
Congress had already intended to protect, and were thus considered
copyrightable from the outset without the need of new legislation. In other cases,
such as photographs, sound recordings, and motion pictures, statutory
enactment was deemed necessary to give them full recognition as copyrightable
works.
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
65. Id. It is noteworthy that the United States is in the minority in this regard. Many
countries are not as stringent with respect to fixation. See Paul Edward Geller, International
Copyright: An Introduction, in 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, at INT-30 to
INT-31 (2003).
66. There is, however, a possibility of protection for such stories under common law
copyright or misappropriation.
67. Student activists were attempting to disseminate certain "smoking gun" business
memos obtained from Diebold regarding their electronic voting machines. Diebold accused the
students of copyright infringement for reproducing entirely ordinary business communications
and persuaded the college to shut down the students' website that hosted the documents.
Although the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) defended the students and asserted the
publication was non-infringing fair use, it did not take issue with Diebold's assertion that the
business memoranda were, as a general matter, appropriate works for copyright protection.
The EFF has posted the case archives at http://www.eff.org/legal/ISP-liability/OPG-v.
Diebold/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
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copyright is primarily about acts of recording, and only collaterally
about artistic creativity.
Of course, the human body records information as well. Within
the nervous system of every human being lies a very impressive set
of sensory input mechanisms-a highly diverse set of high-band-
width visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory, and kinesthetic sensors.68
As Wordsworth noted in "lonely rooms," amid "the din [o]f towns
and cities," when he recalled the Wye, the human mind's playback
technology is equally impressive and complex. 9 Human memory
may be somewhat "lossy"-it obviously lacks the verity and
persistence of contemporary digital formats. Unlike a book or a
compact disc, however, one usually has access to one's internal
recording media, and the mind is powered by a sophisticated search
engine. There is no need to go through boxes in the attic to retrieve
an old memory. The average individual can "retrieve" a musical
tune from years gone by, "replay" a facsimile silently in the mind,
and experience some approximation of the experience of an audible
broadcast. Yet, because the technologies of the human memory are
so poorly understood and so inherently private, they are essentially
ignored by copyright. The RLAA cannot, at this point, pursue those
teenagers who engage in mental piracy with air guitars.7"
Increasingly, however, our private mental recordings and
interpersonal conversations are difficult to disentangle from the
grasp of copyright law. In the past, most conversations took place in
the medium of air, and many social copyright-infringing activities,
especially those of children, were limited to private spaces invisible
to prying eyes.71 In the past twenty years, however, conversations
have become increasingly fixed and public. Our random thoughts
and comments are no longer safely removed from surveillance by
physical space and an evanescent medium. Instead, what we say is
increasingly fixed in public virtual spaces such as weblogs and
listservs, where our random thoughts and reactions are transformed
68. See generally JOSEPH LEDOUX, SYNAPTIC SELF: How OUR BRAINS BECOME WHO WE
ARE (2002).
69. WORDSWORTH & COLERIDGE, supra note 25, at 114.
70. See David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital Age, 10 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 1, 42-43 (1996).
71. See generally Tushnet, supra note 54, at 653 (noting that due to the increasing use of
the Internet, "fan fiction is becoming easier to find and police").
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into new works protected by copyright and subject to monitoring for
purposes of ascertaining infringement.72 Our personal histories and
dossiers of conversation are increasingly archived and searchable.73
A few keystrokes are all that it takes for anyone to unearth a typo-
laden listserv debate that you participated in a decade ago.
Although copyright has not historically regulated our conversa-
tions and private lives, it is doing so today. In an era of ubiquitous
email access and picture-phones, copyright law will increasingly
regulate all forms of human communication. An ever-increasing
number of works will be fixed and therefore protected by copyright,
and an increasing number of fixations will create more opportuni-
ties for the infringement of existing copyrights.74 Almost every
recorded and transmitted image, sound, and set of keystroke data
is a candidate for potential copyright protection or litigation in the
hands of a creative lawyer.75 As Paris Hilton recently demonstrated,
the proliferation of cheap and widespread recording technologies
has led to an increasing merger of private expression with public
ownership, and increasingly flexible notions of what it means to
litigate the "authorship" of a creative work.76
72. See generally James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997). Professor Joseph Liu has pointed out,
relatedly, how copies of copyrighted works themselves are increasingly utilized as part of
these communicative practices. Liu, supra note 3, at 411-12.
73. See generally James M. Rosenbaum, In Defense of the Delete Key, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 393
(2000) (criticizing the legal implications of this trend); see also Margaret Chon, New Wine
Bursting from Old Bottles: Collaborative Internet Art, Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship, 75
OR. L. REV. 257, 261 (1996).
74. The passage of the 1976 Act is also somewhat responsible for this state of affairs in
the United States. Prior to the passage of the 1976 Act, works in the United States were only
within the purview of federal copyright once they were registered, but the 1976 Act removed
that requirement. As David Nimmer has observed, this was a radical shift, but mostly in
terms of the federalization of the broad scope of copyright. Nimmer, supra note 27, at 188-89.
75. Nimmer, supra note 27, at 177-79.
76. In 2003, a widespread Internet distribution occurred of a videotape of Paris Hilton's
sexual encounter with Rick Saloman. Saloman himself marketed the video and even filed a
copyright registration for it. He sued a defendant in federal court for reproducing the video
without his permission. The defendant claimed that Saloman's copyright registration was
invalid because he failed to list Hilton as a co-author who participated in the authorship of
the recording. See Paris Hilton 'Directed' Sex Video, CNN.com (Feb. 24, 2004), available at
www.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZ/02/24/hilton.sextape.reut/.
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C. Copyright and Technologies of Infringement
The current conflicts between technology and copyright are, in
some ways, not very new. Because technology and copyright have
always been inseparable, the struggle over new information
recording and distribution technologies has always animated
copyright law. Copyright holders have vilified the capabilities of
practically all new recording and transmission technologies such as
the radio, photocopying, and the VCR when these technologies
emerged.77 Twenty years ago, it was the cassette tape, not Napster,
that was the bugaboo of the RIAA.78 Responses to new information
recording technologies have been varied. In some cases, such as
broadcast radio, the technologies essentially escaped any severe
copyright regulation.79 The typical modern outcome to heated
technology battles, however, has been technology-specific regula-
tions.80 Just to take one example, legislative battles ultimately led
to specific statutory provisions that regulate the use of photocopy
machines in libraries.8'
77. See Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 61, 66 (2002) [hereinafter Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name] (describing the
general response of copyright holders to new technologies as "Pavlovian"); Jane C. Ginsburg,
Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613,
1622-26 (2001) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Copyright and Control]; see also Richard B. Graves III,
Private Rights, Public Uses, and the Future of the Copyright Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 64, 96-99
(2001) (discussing digital technologies and copyright legislation during the last twenty years);
Wu, supra note 5, at 17-24.
78. Despite the much lamented piracy of home taping, Congress ultimately condoned the
practice. Liu, supra note 3, at 408-09 (describing the Audio Home Recording Act).
79. Of course, this was not a simple matter, and Internet-based radio broadcasting has
been treated differently. See Wu, supra note 5.
80. See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR.
L. REV. 275, 277 (1989); Joseph Liu, Regulatory Copyright 7 (April 26, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=558681; Robert P. Merges, One Hundred
Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000).
81. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 108 and 37 C.F.R. § 201.14, supervised library photocopiers
must display the following notice "printed on heavy paper or other durable material in type
at least 18 points in size, [which] shall be displayed prominently, in such manner and location
as to be clearly visible, legible, and comprehensible to a casual observer within the immediate
vicinity:"
NOTICE WARNING CONCERNING COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS
The copyright law of the United States (title 17, United States Code) governs the
making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material.
Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are
970 [Vol. 46:951
AMATEUR-TO-AMATEUR
The Internet is, in some respects, just another new recording
technology that the stakeholders of copyright law will attempt to
tame.12 It is, in essence, simply a technological protocol enabling the
transmission of packets of data between disparate computers that
are part of a larger network-a new technology of copying. 3 The
crucial difference between the Internet and the photocopier,
however, is not merely the Internet's ubiquity or its digital nature.
Instead, the crucial aspect of the Internet is that it is a unified,
distributed network. The early engineers of the Internet created this
distributed network architecture because it was a much better
means of pooling and sharing information resources.84 When they
crafted the Internet's structure, they ensured that the protocols for
communication were very simple. 5 The Internet protocol does not
recognize the legal distinction between facts and expressions, nor
does it recognize concepts like "derivative works" or "joint author-
ship." The Internet's speed and vitality come from a fundamental
neutrality with regard to the bits it transfers and its lack of central
checkpoints where traffic might be monitored for copyright infringe-
ments. In short, the Internet's logical architecture is a fabulous way
to move any digital file from any computer to any other computer on
a vast network, and to do so in a way that is difficult to monitor.
authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specific
conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for any
purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a
request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of
"fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement.
This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its
judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law.
37 C.F.R. § 201.14 (2003). For unsupervised photocopy machines, the library simply must
"displaya a notice that the making of a copy may be subject to the copyright law." 17 U.S.C.
§ 108(o (2000). For a fascinating account of the struggles leading to these regulations, see
SAMUELS, supra note 43, at 17-30 (2000).
82. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 207, 212-13.
83. See KATIE HAFNER & MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS
OF THE INTERNET (1996) (describing the history of the Internet); DAVID WEINBERGER, SMALL
PIECES LOOSELY JOINED : {A UNIFIED THEORY OF THE WEB} viii-ix (2002) (describing how the
Web "breaks" the traditional publishing model); Boyle, supra note 11, at 40 (noting how
networks make copying ubiquitous).
84. HAFNER & LYON, supra note 83, at 58-59.
85. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 930-34 (2001).
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Over the past decade, many have argued that the network
architecture of the Internet is comparable to the information
revolution initiated by the Gutenberg printing press, and therefore,
a serious re-evaluation of copyright law is required. One of the
earliest and best-known promoters of this view is John Perry
Barlow, co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Ten years
ago, Barlow wrote an influential essay entitled The Economy of
Ideas, in which he summarized the clash between intellectual
property and the prevalent ideology of the Internet community that
"information wants to be free." 6 Intellectual property, said Barlow,
is merely a creature of historical accident. "Digital technology,"
Barlow said, "is detaching information from the physical plane,
where property law of all sorts has always found definition."87 Of
course, intellectual property had always been untethered from the
physical plane; the Internet simply made this fact increasingly
bothersome to many commentators from a theoretical standpoint.8
As Eben Moglen observed, copyright inherently governs informa-
tion patterns, and all information patterns, by definition, can be
expressed as very long numbers. It is counterintuitive to say a
person can own a number, even a very long one, but this is essen-
tially the right to ownership in "expressions" long recognized by
copyright law. 9
Copyright stakeholders saw the Internet in the same way they
viewed the cassette tape, the VCR, and any new technology of
copying. Indeed, these stakeholders saw the Internet in the same
way that the English Crown saw the printing press when it
emerged. To a certain extent, Barlow's stance demonstrated a
86. Barlow, supra note 16. For discussions of this ideology, see STEWART BRAND, THE
MEDIA LAB INVENTING THE FUTURE AT M.I.T. 202 (1987); Mark S. Nadel, How Current
Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output: The Overlooked Impact of Marketing, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 825 & n.186 (2004).
87. Barlow, supra note 16, at 85. Over 180 law review articles reference the work,
including Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0, 79 TEX. L. REV. 447, 447 n.1 (2000), and
C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 913 n.60
(2002). Not all articles are complimentary of the thesis. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Copyright and
Control, supra note 77, at 1642 (rejecting thesis in favor of heightened control).
88. See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 118-19.
89. See Moglen, supra note 11. Professor Moglen's virulent critique of copyright is offered




fundamental ideological chasm between the Internet's culture of
pro-sharing copy-leftists and the corporations and lawyers who
police copyright interests. Ralph Oman, the United States Register
of Copyright during the early 1980s, recently revealed this culture
gap by opining that the Internet of the 1990s was simply a "glorified
chatboard" dominated by "computer nerds ... hackers, pirates, and
porno creeps."' "Nerds" and "hackers" were apparently epithets.
The copyright industry's special antipathy for the Internet,
however, was not simply about a culture clash with the likes of
Barlow, who was a lyricist for the Grateful Dead. It was more or less
the same Pavlovian reaction that the established copyright industry
has had to all new technologies.91 It was eminently reasonable for
the industry to be concerned about a medium where everyone could
distribute information and no one could monitor all channels of
communication. Releasing works on the Internet was obviously
unwise because unauthorized distribution would be so easy.
Although file encryption and password protection offered some
security, those digital wrappers could be broken, and, in the eyes of
copyright holders, the oceans of the Internet simply were not safe
for sailing.92
Concern about piracy on the high seas of the Internet eventually
resulted in passage of the new para-copyright anti-circumvention
protections of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which
essentially forbid the unlocking of digital locks or the trafficking
in software that accomplishes such unlocking.93 Oman and other
drafters and advocates of the DMCA stated that such para-copyright
90. Ralph Oman, Address at New Jersey Intellectual Property Law Association (Feb. 8,
2001), availableat httpJ/www.dechert.com/library/Copyright-107th%2Congress%20ROman%
202-01.PDF, at *3.
91. See Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name, supra note 77, at 66.
92. See Graves, supra note 77, at 96. In his 2001 address, Ralph Oman commented that,
[ulnless copyright owners have a measure of security for their valuable
programming in the digital environment, they won't license their works for use
on the Internet. And if they don't license their movies, and music, and computer
programs, it will never reach its full potential as a broad avenue for mass
entertainment, scholarly discourse, and electronic commerce.
Oman, supra note 90, at *3.
93. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000); Neil A. Benchell, The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act: A Review of the Law and the Court's Interpretation, 21 J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 1, 3 (2002). For a scathing critique of the DMCA from the standpoint of the goals of
copyright, see Lunney, supra note 55, at 830-44.
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protections were absolutely required if corporate content owners like
Disney and Time Warner were to be expected to risk transforming
the Internet's information-sharing hordes into a civilized society.94
Yet despite the passage of the DMCA, the copyright industry did not
bring the world the anticipated "celestial jukebox" of on-demand
content libraries.95 Instead, Napster brought music to the masses,
and the majority of news stories about copyright and the Internet
today are stories of litigation, criminal prosecutions, and the need
for still greater rights and harsher penalties for infringement. When
one hears that a current movie or novel can be obtained on the
Internet, one presumes that the copyright holders are not happy.
The copyright industries have laid out the issue in this way:
how can the problem posed by the Internet as a copying machine
be solved? How can we best re-tool the Internet so that Britney
Spears MP3s are no longer traded on Kazaa? The industries' current
answer, for the most part, seems to be a combination of press
releases about the costs of piracy, sweeping litigation, and legisla-
tive attempts to prevent or significantly change the shape of new
technologies.
Note, however, how posing the question this way categorically
ignores the contributions of copyright amateurs. The Internet's
social prominence today owes little to the illicit trade in Britney
Spears's MP3s. The utility of the Internet is probably best exempli-
fied by Google and other search engines, which provide free delivery
of an abundance of copyright-protected works. From the standpoint
of copyright, the most remarkable thing about the social phenome-
non of Google is that Google does not charge per copy or per use, and
neither do the abundance of websites, discussion lists, and informa-
tion sources that Google indexes.96 In other words, works (web
94. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998); Jane C. Ginsburg, Can Copyright Become User-
Friendly? Review: JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, 25 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 71, 78
& n.29 (2001); Oman, supra note 90; see also Liu, supra note 3, at 403-04 (noting how the
DMCA was premised on the notion of an entertainment industry providing content to passive
information consumers).
95. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 236 (1994); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative
Destruction of Copyright: Napster And the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 263, 264-65 (2002) (explaining Professor Goldstein's notion of the "celestial jukebox").
96. In fact, Google's search algorithm essentially discriminates against password-
protected works because its search engine cannot "see" works for which payment is required,
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pages) that fall within the ambit of copyright are being provided to
hundreds of millions of people through Google, and the authors of
these works are not doing much to limit wide public access to their
information property.97
Barlow's fundamental insight, therefore, that costless, perfect
reproduction would change copyright as a social institution was
completely true. The problem is that copyright law has yet to notice
this change, because copyright law is bound up in corporate
intellectual property libraries, which are deployed through profit-
driven industries. In the sections below, we will attempt to describe
the amateur and decentralized production processes that are
forming an alternative to copyright today. Our goal is perhaps
ridiculously overbroad; we would like to provide a "big picture"
account of the current changes in social information practices
regarding content and the role new technologies are playing in the
transformation. Even though our account will be, of necessity,
abbreviated, anecdotal, and generalized, we think that by decompos-
ing the functions that make up the lifecycle of content we can
understand the impact of new network technologies.98 This will lead
to a better understanding of what we should do about copyright.
II. CONTENT AND COPYRIGHT
For the last ten years we have been told that copyright is
finished.99 Legal scholars began to build new theories of copyright
around changes that digital technology brings. Scholars sought to
and thus cannot index those websites. Google also prioritizes works based on perceived
popularity, and, inevitably, free-access websites are more popular than websites that demand
payment for access to content.
97. See Jessica Litman, Electronic Commerce and Free Speech, 1 ETHICS & INFO. TECH.
213, 213 (1999).
98. See Barlow, supra note 16. Mark Nadel has a similar interest in articulating and
analyzing discrete "stages" of social activities relevant to the copyright process. See Nadel,
supra note 86, at 822-37.
99. See generally Barlow, supra note 16. The essay is full of rhetorical excess and ranges
over many arguments why the Internet will destroy copyright. It includes observations that
jurisdictional problems will be fatal, that information is a "[v]erb [n]ot a [n]oun" and that
"[i]nformation is a [r]elationship" not a thing. Much of this is amusing, though the core insight
remains (and it was all the more interesting and surprising that it came from a member of
The Grateful Dead): a person who would ordinarily be viewed as favoring strong copyright
protection as the basis for commercial exploitation of his expression.
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theorize the implications of costless dissemination via peer-to-peer
networks: Ray Ku,1° Jessica Litman,' Jane Ginsburg,1"2 Stacey
Dogan,l0 3 and Joseph Liu,10 4 amongst many others, 0 5 explained how
the Internet changes everything. Some of these scholars also
recognized the role that cheap reproduction had upon copyright.1°6
The loss of centralized control over reproduction and dissemination,
however, is only part of the story. Other scholars have begun to note
how the loss of centralized control penetrates into other functions of
copyright. Most notably, Yochai Benkler suggested that the
decentralized production of copyright material has important policy
100. Ku, supra note 95, at 270-74, 296-305 (contrasting the cost differentials between
analog and digital copying and distribution); Ku, supra note 5, at 564-67 (identifying peer-to-
peer networks as a force of "creative destruction"-a process that revolutionizes economic
structure by destroying the old structure and creating a new one).
101. Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 341-42 (2002)
(characterizing ease of dissemination as a removal of distribution intermediaries).
102. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control, supra note 77, at 1637-39 (examining legal
responses to peer-to-peer systems and noting significant controls exerted by courts in favor
of copyright owners).
103. Stacey L. Dogan, Code Versus the Common Law, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 71,
90-100 (2003) (noting the development of centralized and then non-centralized peer-to-peer
distribution mechanisms and the legal response to each).
104. Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy
Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1255 (2001) ("Copies of copyrighted works can now
be distributed in digital form, without the exchange of any physical object, without any title
in.physical property changing hands, and all indications suggest that this will only increase
over time, as computer network capacities increase and compression technologies improve.").
105. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that a centralized directory made it possible for Napster to block trading of infringing files
identified by music copyright owners); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 259
F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1041 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (finding no contributory infringement by providers
of file-sharing software that played no continuing role in facilitating exchange of files between
users); see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651-52 (7th Cir. 2003) (shifting
the burden of production to Aimster to demonstrate that its software has substantial non-
infringing uses); Eric Schlachter, The Intellectual Property Renaissance in Cyberspace: Why
Copyright Law Could Be Unimportant on the Internet, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 15, 19-20
(1997) (noting the changes in the copyright regime brought about by costless reproduction and
distribution of exact digital copies); Damien A. Riehl, Note, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems:
Will Napster, Gnutella, and Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1761, 1766-86 (2001) (discussing the technologies of several peer-to-peer
file sharing software systems and the legal implications of their architecture); Joseph A.
Sifferd, Note, The Peer-to-Peer Revolution: A Post-Napster Analysis of the Rapidly Developing
File-Sharing Technology, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 92, 107 (2002) (suggesting that findings
against fie-sharing software won't stop peer-to-peer networks).
106. See generally LITMAN, supra note 4, at 25-27; Ku, supra note 95, at 270-74.
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implications.1 17 Outside legal academia, other advocates and
scholars, such as Peter Suber and participants in the "Open Access
Movement" have challenged the traditional expectations of copy-
right and journal publishing in higher education."08
Something, however, is missing here. In this Part we wish to
demonstrate how these changes are not really about copyright, but
rather about the amateur development of content. Specifically, we
suggest that the salient issue is how information content is
communicated from creators to users. In this Part we want to show
that, beyond the observations of other scholars, we are seeing the
decentralization and consequent "amateurization" of every one of
the functions that are necessary for content to move into society.
In order to understand the nature and implications of this
amateurization, it is necessary to understand how, until recently,
copyright relied on centralized control in the context of multiple
functions, and how each of those functions reinforced the others in
maintaining the supremacy of copyright in commercialized informa-
tion markets.
Thus, in this Part we begin by examining how content travels
from creator to user. We then examine the way that these functions
were originally centralized, and how they have since become
decentralized. We conclude by asking what this trend means for
copyright industries and the amateur producer of content.
A. The Content Functions
In the past, copyright has entailed seven discrete functions: 1)
creation; 2) selection; 3) production; 4) dissemination; 5) promotion;
6) purchase; and 7) use. We can think of this as the content lifecycle,
passing the content from the creator and eventually on to the user.
Copyright controlled these functions in the past; however, we will
107. See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE
L.J. 369, 381-99 (2002) [hereinafter Benkler, Coase's Penguin] (examining the nature of peer
production of content in various copyright-based industries including, inter alia, software
production, data analysis, essay-writing, and commentary). Benkler is also mindful of the role
decentralized dissemination plays. See Benkler, Freedom in the Commons, supra note 11, at
1251-52.
108. See, e.g., Peter Suber, Open Letter from 25 Nobel Laureates, OPEN AcCEss NEWS, at
http://www.earlham.edu/-peters/fos/fosblog.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
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show that with the development of digital technology, the Internet,
and social software, distributed information networks are pushing
content control away from commercial exploitation and toward an
amateur-to-amateur model.
1. Creation
In the beginning was the word. Copyright began with the word,
though today it can also begin with the mark, the sound, or,
increasingly, with the motion of a mouse or the tap of a finger on a
keyboard. In the instant before the word, some idea or concept
presumably will precede the action that gives rise to copyright. We
are only concerned, however, with how content-the pattern of
information-moves from its origin to its social use. We therefore
need only examine the information itself.
In textual works, such as this law review Article, words are
piled on words, forming sentences, which in turn form para-
graphs, and eventually the process stops. The collection of words
that results is called, somewhat arbitrarily, "the final work." We call
this first stage, in which a creator writes, composes, draws, paints,
or otherwise creates fixed expression, "creation." Although the
legal scope of the created product is curtailed by the idea-expres-
sion doctrine, °9 the merger doctrine,1 ° scones & faire,11 and the
109. Copyright protects only the expression of an idea, not the idea itself, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(2000) ("In no case does copyright protection ... extend to any idea, ... regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied...."). The standard account of how
one draws the line between idea and expression was given by Judge Learned Hand. See Peter
Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
110. The merger doctrine applies where the idea and the expression of that idea have
merged, making the otherwise copyrighted expression not protected. "Under the merger
doctrine, copyright protection is denied to expression that is inseparable from or merged with
the ideas, processes, or discoveries underlying the expression." Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando
Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993). See, e.g., Schoolhouse, Inc. v. Anderson, 275
F.3d 726, 730 (8th Cir. 2002) (website not infringing on magazine's local school information
because there was "only one way or only a few ways of expressing [the] idea"); Computer
Assoc. Int'l, v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992) (where computer program was "the
only and essential means of accomplishing a given task" the expression and idea had merged).
111. Scnnes & faire are otherwise copyright expressive elements that "necessarily result
from the choice of a setting or situation." Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d
Cir. 1986). Because they are unprotected, unauthorized reproduction does not constitute
infringement. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding representation of Hindenberg disaster not infringement, as similarities were
978 [Vol. 46:951
AMATEUR-TO-AMATEUR
like, 112 these details are not delimited in the text, image, or soundrecording itself, which is invariably understood as something new
that was "created."
Creation has been in the hands of amateurs for some time, butonly for a limited set of works; most notably we saw this in areaslike textual production, where all one needed was a quill or pen inorder to create. The nature of creation for many fields, however, hasbeen corporate, collaborative creativity, not individual creativity." 3Corporate creation involves creative teams: perhaps multiple
collaborating script-writers; songwriters and sound engineers; lawreview "authors" who sketch the idea and law review "editors" whofix their problems. The salient issue here is that, except for a smallgroup of content arenas, creation was mediated through capital. Aswe discuss in the next two sections, this changes with the introduc-
tion of digital technology.
a. Digital Technology and Expensive Authorship
In the eighteenth century, the original copyright law, the Statute
of Anne, limited protected "works" to books and other forms ofwriting. The Statute of Anne signaled a radical decentralization ofcontrol. Book production moved away from state censorship andmonopoly printing practices, toward individual rights of authors
determined by portrayal of the subject matter).112. Other issues going to the appropriate balance in the protection of expression and ideasinclude: the jurisprudence on works of utility; functional aspects of protected works (see, e.g.,Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1546 n.28 (11th Cir. 1996); Sega Enterprises Ltd.v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,799 F. Supp. 1006, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 1992), affd 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994)); and protectionof facts (see, e.g., Jacqueline Lipton, Balancing Private Rights and Public Policies:Reconceptualizing Property in Databases, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773, 809-14 (2003); J.H.Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for ScientificData in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.315 (2003) (discussing the protection of scientific data).113. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THECONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 51-60, 159-161 (1996) (discussing the historyof the concept of authorship and the construction of self-interest and romantic authorship);ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP,APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 211-12, 219-20 (1998) (examining problems with the conceptof romantic authorship); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property,75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1997) (reviewing BOYLE, supra).
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as proprietors of their creations. 1 4 At the time the Statute of
Anne was written, the "author" was not a person who created
random or accidental fixations of original information by techno-
logical means." 5 The paradigmatic Romantic author was, as many
commentators have observed, a quasi-mythological genius, inspired
by a divine muse while laboring in a secluded garret. 116 Authorship
in that model was governed by a particular technology. The work
created by the Romantic author was usually a rather long sequen-
tial string of letters and spaces. Although one might suggest that
the original works were made on paper with ink and quill pens, the
relevant work was understood to be the letters and spaces in
sequence, not the calligraphic aspects of the writing. This remains
true today. It makes no difference whether one reads the original
hand-written poems of Wordsworth, a recently printed edition of
those poems bound on paper, or the same string of letters and
spaces on a computer screen. In each of those cases, you can
confidently assert that you have read the work of Wordsworth.
The technology of creating a long string of letters and spaces
has always been the relatively cheap technology we call writing.
Copyright, however, has expanded far past the technology of letters
and the printing press, and the twentieth century's technologies
of commercial fixation and recording were not always cheap."
7
The expense of creative technologies has historically exerted
powerful influence on the practices of authorship. Indeed, in some
realms of authorship, it has simply been beyond the capabilities of
the amateur creator to make new works. Where creative technolo-
gies have been expensive, this has driven the process of work
creation toward greater social collaboration. The technology of
motion picture production, for instance, has always been heroically
expensive and cumbersome. Historically, aspiring film makers were
unable to produce motion pictures without the help of financial
backers and technical specialists. It is not surprising then, that
114. See Geller, supra note 1, at 225; Lunney, supra note 55, at 814-19.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 58-64.
116. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 113, at 51-60, 159-161 (discussing the history of the
concept of authorship and the construction of self-interest and romantic authorship).
117. See Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the
Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 781-82 (2001) (describing the historic
expansion of copyright to embrace new technologies).
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since the inception of the motion picture, the copyright industry of
film creation has emerged in a set of geographically centralized
markets and has relied on large scale collaborative authorship to tie
together the interests of those who invest in projects with those who
create the work."' Motion picture creation, as any end-credit
sequence will reveal, involves the efforts of numerous script writers,
directors, actors, camera crews, best boys, special effects artists, and
so on. Moreover, the dominant means of controlling groups of people
is, of course, the firm. Hence, we saw the emergence of the motion
picture industry structured around a small number of studios.
Other domains, like music, film, and television, have also
employed expensive technologies of authorship, and therefore have
similarly involved investors, marketers, and creative teams in the
process of creating new works.119 In popular music, for instance, the
creation of a hit song will often involve a number of disparate
groups of actors. The process may include the creation of the
musical composition by one or more individuals, the studio perfor-
mance of that composition by another individual or group, and the
editing of the sound recording by another group. In television
production, one finds multiple collaborating script-writers, creative
directors, actors, and set crews. In animation, various teams
supervise different aspects of the creative process. In the software
industry, a team of programmers will create and refine the code of
a major project. Generally these forms of collaboration take place
under the control of employment contracts whereby the authors
transfer their copyrights to the employers or an assignee. 2 '
118. See Rosemary J. Coombe, Fear, Hope, and Longing for the Future of Authorship and
a Revitalized Public Domain in Global Regimes of Intellectual Property, 52 DEPAUL L. REV.
1171, 1175 (2003); F. Jay Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint? Issues in theAuthorship of Motion
Pictures Under U.S. Copyright Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 225, 282-316 (2001) (discussing the
numerous collaborators in the creation process); Corey Field, Their Master's Voice? Recording
Artists, Bright Lines, and Bowie Bonds: The Debate Over Sound Recordings as Works Made
for Hire, 48 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 145, 155 (2000); Geller, supra note 1, at 229.
119. See Geller, supra note 1, at 228-29 (describing how the expansion of copyright has,
historically, allowed for greater risks to be taken in producing "more capital intensive works");
Liu, supra note 3, at 398.
120. See Karen Gulick, Creative Control, Attribution and the Need for Disclosure: A Study
of Incentives in the Motion Picture Industry, 27 CONN. L. REV. 53, 56 (1994) ("Mlost motion
picture artists--directors, screenwriters, and cinematographers-retain no legal control over
the commercial exploitation of their work.... Motion pictures ... are made through work for
hire agreements which designate the financial entity supporting the film-usually a studio
2004]
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Advances in technology, however, are dramatically reducing the
costs of formerly expensive creative genres. Digital technology has
reduced creation cost largely by, as John Perry Barlow observed,
detaching information from the physical plane.12' The reduced cost
of digital information storage and processing has shifted the
technologies of information capture, processing, and storage away
from more cumbersome analog equipment to cheap, lightweight
digital equipment and software. This shift has placed into the hands
of the individual the expensive creation tools that were previously
only available to professionals in the content industries.'22 For
instance, in the area of musical creation, software tools today can
replicate almost all the capabilities of the 1980s or 1990s recording
studio. Tools like Sonic Foundry's ACID range, Apple's GarageBand,
and Digidesign's ProTools now provide amateurs with high quality
recording, looping, voice cleaning and audio effects for less than the
price of a second-hand guitar. 2 ' Further, some of the early results
of these amateur-friendly technologies have competed successfully
with the results of professional producers. In late 2003, Gary Jules
and Michael Andrews's cover version of Tears for Fears' "Mad
World" went to number one on the English charts. It was produced
in Andrews' basement for $50.124
This is true for virtually all other types of content as well-the
costs of capital that once precluded amateur creation and required
or production company-as the 'author' of the work.").
121. See Barlow, supra note 16, at 85. See generally CREATING DIGITAL CONTENT: VIDEO
PRODUCTION FOR WEB BROADCAST AND CINEMA (John Rice & Brian McKernan eds., 2002)
[hereinafter CREATING DIGITAL CONTENT].
122. See Graves, supra note 77, at 81.
123. Sonic Foundry's ACID range costs around $25 for the basic package, with looping and
drum tracks for about another $15. See http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/search-handle-
url/index%3Dsoftware%26field-manufacturer%3DSonic%2520Foundry%26search-
type%3Dss/104-4828665-3631918 (last visited Sept. 6, 2004). Apple's GarageBand comes
bundled with the iLife package which retails for $49, and includes other media creation
products discussed below. See http://www.apple.comlilife/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2004). A large
number of instrument loops and effects are available. See http://www.apple.comilife/
garagebandl (last visited Sept. 6, 2004). ProTools is more expensive, because it is an industry-
standard product, and retails for thousands of dollars. DigiDesign, however, offers a free
version that allows for eight audio tracks and forty-eight midi tracks. See
http://www.digidesign.com/ ptfree/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).




large-scale capital are rapidly vanishing. In the case of movies, it
was long true that cameras, film stock, editing suites, and master-
ing devices were prohibitively expensive for all but the highly
capitalized players. Today we are seeing the costs of both informa-
tion capture and editing drop dramatically. The editing tools are
now purely digital. Jonathan Caouette's first movie, Tarnation, was
shown at the Sundance Film Festival. It is probably the first
feature-length film edited entirely on iMovie, and cost $218.32 in
videotape and materials. 2 ' In another example, the political group
MoveOn.org sponsored a competition for television advertisements
attacking President Bush.'26 They received hundreds of entries, all
shot and edited by individuals, and the quality was generally
comparable to broadcast advertising standards.
1 27
The proliferation of cheap, software-enabled authoring tools has
affected all copyright industries. The impact of digitization on
amateur authorship first became obvious in the 1980s and 1990s
with the advent of the home personal computer. The standard-issue
desktop publishing programs on new home personal computers
enabled amateur writers to compose, edit, typeset, and print legible
and attractive materials in ways that were previously only within
the technical capabilities of the professional publishing industry.
21
Desktop publishing significantly transformed printed textual
information practices in our society. Although it spelled the
impending demise of many small commercial printing shops, it left
the book publishing industry largely internalizing the technological
shift. Distributing desktop-published paper texts was not possible
on a grand scale for the average individual. Yet, as we discuss in
125. See Jason Silverman, Here's the Price of Fame: $218.32, WIRED (Jan. 20, 2004),
available at http://www.wired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,61970,0O.html?tw=wn-tophead_2.
126. See Bush in 30 Seconds, A Political Advertising Contest, at http://www.bushin
30seconds.org (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
127. The advertisements had to be television broadcast quality because the winner of the
competition for best ad was to be aired during the Superbowl. Though MoveOn.org received
sufficient money to pay for the airtime, CBS declined to run the commercial. The winning
advertisement was broadcast during the President's State of the Union address,
http://www.bushin30seconds.org/rules.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
128. See generally STEVEN LEVY, INSANELY GREAT: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF MACINTOSH, THE
COMPUTER THAT CHANGED EVERYTHING 210-11 (1994) (discussing the origins of word
processing); Wikipedia, Word Processor, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilWord-processor (last
visited Sept. 6, 2004).
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more detail below, personal computer networks in the 1980s did
begin to shift distribution potential to individuals. Email messages,
USENET and BBS discussions, educational papers, and FAQs
proliferated during the 1980s. Today, the Web is clearly the primary
home of amateur creativity.
Weblogs, as mentioned before, are an increasing presence in the
media. Most of the millions of weblogs today are decidedly amateur
and personal works, recording the author's life experiences, random
thoughts and observations, and romantic crises. If one does not
know the blogger, this type of material may not be very interest-
ing-yet almost every blogger has a friend or family member who
will serve as an occasional reader. Some bloggers have even become
the equivalent of small-town celebrities, attracting hundreds of
thousands of readers per day. A growing number of legal scholars
and practitioners participate in creating the blogosphere, 129 and
members of the judiciary are even beginning to footnote the weblogs
that they read regularly.
1 30
As discussed below, weblogs are increasingly offering one-stop
information and entertainment shopping by delivering, in addition
to hyperlinks and textual commentary, original digital photography,
music and sound files, software programs, and multimedia presen-
tations. Google's recent purchase and funding of Blogger (a leading,
free blog-hosting and creation application) makes abundant
sense-weblogs are facilitating the creation of amateur authorship
and Google is turning its profits and gaining cultural ascendancy by
helping people sift through an expanding universe of amateur
works.
b. Cheap Authorship and Prior Works
Beyond these observations about the nature of technology, it is
important to consider the role that cheap authorship and prior
129. Glen Reynolds was one of the first blogging law professors, but the field is increasingly
crowded these days. Jack Balkin, Paul Caron, Brian Leiter, Larry Lessig, David Post, Larry
Solum, Larry Ribstein, and Eugene Volokh are just a few of the many legal bloggers.
130. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently cited
Howard Bashman, who writes the appellate web log, "How Appealling," now hosted by Legal
Affairs magazine. See Kennedy v. Lockyer, No. 01-55246, 2004 WL 1837738, at *21 n.7 (9th
Cir. Aug. 18, 2004).
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works play in the content field. New information capture and
distribution technologies have the obvious effect of creating conflicts
between the newly empowered and established industry players.
Obviously, every new way in which an amateur can faithfully
reproduce existing images of Barbie or Mickey Mouse is a new way
the amateur can violate Mattel or Disney's copyrights in those
images. The most evident conflict created for amateur creators,
however, is the copyright problem inherent in creating "new" works.
As discussed briefly above, even capturing "factual" information
may, in theory, place a person at risk of a copyright lawsuit. '31
Creating entirely new works, as many scholars have observed, can
be equally problematic.1
3 2
The human environment does not generally resemble the River
Wye, but instead is a media-saturated realm of copyright-protected
information in the form of texts, images, and sounds, which
invariably become part of our cultural vocabulary. 3 3 Although
every new creation borrows from prior works, some genres of
creative expression, such as parody, are required to do so. If there
was any change in the twentieth century, it was toward increased
practices of borrowing in authorship. From Duchamp's drawing of
a moustache on the Mona Lisa to The Simpsons, artists increasingly
engage in quotation, mark-up, commentary, pastiche, collage, and
re-contextualization in order to express themselves. 3 1 Viewing
artistic creativity as primarily about borrowing is at odds, however,
with copyright, which, to an unclear extent, requires that a license
be obtained whenever a prior work is borrowed and incorporated
into a new one. A copyright holder's rights include the right to
prohibit new works that incorporate bits and pieces of prior works
131. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
132. As a recent student note explained, creation by copying has ancient origins:
The Book of Genesis rewrote the Mesopotamian creation myth. The Book of
Chronicles rewrote large sections of the Book of Kings. Authors of the myriad
rewritings of Shakespeare probably learned from Shakespeare himself, whose
plays often rewrote prior texts. Milton's Paradise Lost, Joyce's Ulysses, T.S.
Eliot's The Waste Land-all are rewritings in their own ways. Indeed, all writing
is, in some sense, rewriting.
Note, Originality, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1988, 1990 (2002) (citations omitted).
133. See generally Coombe, supra note 118.
134. See generally MARY SETTEGAST, MONA LISA'S MOUSTACHE: MAKING SENSE OF A
DISSOLVING WORLD (2002).
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as well as works that are derivative of prior works. For instance, if
the DaVinci family had retained the copyright in the Mona Lisa,
Duchamp clearly would have needed a license to reproduce his
modified version.135
Rebecca Tushnet has previously discussed similar unauthorized
creativity in works of fan fiction posted on the Internet. 136 The
practice of unauthorized "sampling" of prior works is also common
on the Internet. Bloggers often link to, quote from, and comment
upon other written works posted online by newspapers and other
bloggers. Sometimes the extent of such blog "sampling" triggers
lawsuits. In the Free Republic case, for instance, members of a
political bulletin board posted the full texts of various newspaper
articles, a clear instance of copyright infringement.137 The articles
were reproduced for purposes of comment, and the subsequent
discussion focused on the factual news, not the creative arrange-
ment and selection of particular journalistic adjectives. The Los
Angeles Times and a number of other newspaper proprietors
brought suit, however, and the court had no hesitation in rejecting
the defendant's arguments that this could be a fair use of the news
stories. 38
The court stressed that the articles were copied in their entirety,
which in its opinion was not necessary for the purposes of commen-
tary.'39 Free Republic argued that the plaintiffs were not deprived
of advertising revenue, because Free Republic referrals gener-
ated hundreds of thousands of additional hits per month. 140 The
court thought this irrelevant: the newspapers themselves were
attempting to exploit online markets, and the Free Republic site had
the potential to interfere with these markets.' End of case.
Emboldened by this sort of approach, other news services have
135. Although the litigation would surely be interesting for copyright scholars, it seems
unlikely that Duchamp's addition of a moustache (and letters) would have met the
requirements for a successful fair use defense.
136. See Tushnet, supra note 54, at 663-64.
137. L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1471-72 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Benkler,
Freedom in the Commons, supra note 11, at 1263-64; Liu, supra note 3, at 414 (identifying the
use of newspaper articles as "communal consumption").
138. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1472.
139. Id. at 1463.




recently given warning to blog proprietors that they will scan for
copyright infringements, and some websites of old media moguls
warn bloggers against providing hyperlinks to their story pages.
142
In music, copyright law has also been required to address the
incorporation of unauthorized portions of prior works into new
recordings. Today "mash-ups," are a common form of creativity.
Mash-ups are dance club remixes that typically merge a well-known
vocal track with an equally well-known instrumental track: hence
the classic Smells like Booty blends Destiny's Child with Nirvana's
Smells Like Teen Spirit.14 These mixes seamlessly merge multiple
tracks in tension with each other. The best mash-ups merge wholly
disparate styles, punk with R&B or dance with heavy metal, and are
named accordingly: "Kylie Minogue vs New Order" or "The Ramones
vs Abba.' Although mash-ups are creative and interesting to some
listeners, they are generally unlicensed and thus illegal.
1 45
Recently, a mash-up by an amateur called DJ Danger Mouse
featured an extended remix of the Beatles' White Album with Jay-
Z's The Black Album to create, inevitably, The Grey Album.' 46 This
album was made available on peer-to-peer networks, and was
critically acclaimed by some reviewers; 47 but its widespread
popularity generated cease-and-desist letters from the holders of the
rights in the Beatles back catalog.14 The Grey Album quickly
became a cause cdl~bre for online activists. 49 The key point is not
142. See, e.g., Reuters Position on Linking from Blogs (Mar. 30, 2004), at http://www.
paidcontent.org/ pcarch/2004_03_30.shtml.
143. See Roberta Cruger, The Mash-up Revolution, SALON.COM (Aug. 9, 2003), at http://
archive.salon.com/ent/music/feature/2003/08/09/mashups-cruger/print.html. For examples of
hip-hop boards that allow for online mash-ups, see: http://www.urbansmarts.comreviewsl
albums/lumin.htm (last visited Sept. 6,2004); http://www.definitivejux.net/ (last visited Sept.
6, 2004); and http://sonicsum.com/cgi-bin/Ultimate.cgi (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
144. See Cruger, supra note 143.
145. See id.
146. See Ben Greenman, The Mouse that Remixed, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 9, 2004, at 24,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/talklcontent/?040209tatalk-greenman.
147. See Lauren Gitlin, Jay-Z Meets the Beatles: DJ Mixes Two Albums into One Classic,
ROLLING STONE, Feb. 19, 2004, at 18, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story?id
=5937152.
148. See Joseph Patel, Producer of The Grey Album, Jay-ZI Beatles Mash- Up, Gets Served,
MTV NEWS, Feb. 10, 2004, at http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1484938/20040210/jay-z.
jhtml?headlines=true.
149. A nonprofit music activist organization called Downhill Battle organized Grey
Tuesday, a day of civil copyright disobedience on Feb. 24, 2004. See Incredible Success, Grey
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that it is wrong to see The Grey Album as an infringement of
copyright. It surely is. The question remains, however, whether
society benefits by legally requiring mash-up artists to seek licenses
before creating works like The Grey Album."'.
Unauthorized amateur authorship poses new challenges for
copyright law. 5 Images, sounds, and text are becoming increasingly
easy to locate through the Internet. Cheap digital creation tools
enable these works to be manipulated by amateurs lacking the
financial means to obtain copyright licenses. Yet this type of
amateur creativity is producing valuable new work that, while
popular, is outside the scheme of copyright.5 2
Tuesday, at http://www.greytuesday.org/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2004); Downhill Battle, at
http://www.downhillbattle.org (last visited Aug. 24, 2004). For a discussion of the event and
its aftermath, see Bill Werde, Defiant Downloads Rise from Underground, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 2004, at E3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02125/arts/music25REMI.html.
150. The current system requires amateurs to bear the costs associated with finding the
rights holder, negotiating, and making royalty payments. Amateurs are generally not willing
to bear these costs, which may be daunting even to those in the copyright business. See
generally LESSIG, supra note 62, at 95-97 (recounting Jon Else's problems in attempting to get
copyright clearance for incorporating a few seconds of a Simpsons episode in the background
of a documentary film); Litman, supra note 56, at 252-53 (discussing whether people would
regard a legal rule allowing free use of copyrighted work for personal purposes as being fair
and sensible); see also LESSIG, supra note 62, at 19 ("The technologies of publishing [in the
past] were expensive; that meant the vast majority of publishing was commercial. Commercial
entities could bear the burden of the law--even the burden of the Byzantine complexity that
copyright law has become."); SAMUELS, supra note 43, at 269 ("It's cost me about twice my
advance just to acquire the photos [in the book] and pay for the permissions to use them. (Now
I know why no one has ever written a book like this.)").
151. See Litman, supra note 56, at 237; Tushnet, supra note 54, at 651.
152. Works such as The Grey Album are "outside the scheme of copyright" in two
significant ways. First, they are outside the financial incentive and distribution schemes of
copyright. See generally Benkler, Coase's Penguin, supra note 107, at 396-99 (noting that
value-added distribution can be achieved by peer distribution on the Internet). Second, they
are generally not protected by copyright because they intertwine new creative effort with the
unauthorized use of preexisting material. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). Even where
collaborative digital works are authorized, they create significant and difficult copyright
issues. See generally Chon, supra note 73, at 270-72 (discussing the difficulty of applying print
based copyright law to collaborative digitized works); Corey Field, Copyright Co-Ownership
in Cyberspace: The Digital Merger of Content and Technology in Digital Rights Management
and E-commerce, 19 ENT. & SPORTS LAWYER 3, 3-5 (2001) (discussing copyright issues
associated with distributing authorized digital files that contain both proprietary
entertainment content and software technology); Liu, supra note 3, at 418-20 (noting that




In summary, we offer two primary observations about the current
impact of networked technologies on creation. First, cheap digital
technologies of authorship are increasingly allowing individual,
poorly capitalized players to produce works that are competing for
attention with the works created by corporate and highly capitalized
players. Second, distributed networks are encouraging new forms of
collaborative creativity. These new forms are largely amateur,
highly decentralized, and are in conflict with the legal rules imposed
by copyright to regulate creative practices.153 Perhaps most impor-
tantly, these new forms threaten the business models of copyright
industries and create potential infringements of existing copyrights.
For these reasons, they are subject to attack.
2. Selection
The next function in the traditional chain of copyright practices
is selection. By "selection" we mean the exercise of some discrimina-
tory judgment over which creative works warrant reproduction and
distribution. That is, the process whereby someone decides which
works are worthy of the additional investment necessary for it to
move outside the author's study, out into society. One might suggest
that creation itself is a form of selection. Every process of creating
new work actually involves the intentional or accidental selection of
words, sounds, and images from a palette of options. As discussed
above, however, this type of selection is construed by copyright law
as the creation of a new work.
To understand the importance of the selection function to
established copyright practices, consider how the "spec screenplay"
market functions. Tens of thousands of speculative screenplays
are created each year by aspiring writers, and mailed to agents,
producers, actors, and others involved in the commercial movie
industry.154 Most such "spec scripts" go unread, a number are read
and rejected, and a very tiny percentage of manuscripts are actually
153. See generally Litman, supra note 56.
154. See ROBERT W. BLY, How TO GET YOUR BOOK PUBLISHED: INSIDE SECRETS OF A
SUCCESSFULAUTHOR (2000) (describing a process to get a spec book published); THOM TAYLOR,
THE BIG DEAL: HOLLYWOOD'S MILLION-DOLLAR SPEC SCRIPT MARKET 6-19 (1999) (describing
the boom in spec scripts beginning after the 1988 strike by the Writers Guild of America).
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adjudged worthy of commercial development. The decision that a
script is worth producing is the epitome of the selection function.
Similar selection functions exist in every copyright industry.
Aspiring musicians, singers, and songwriters send demo tapes to a
jaded and besieged group of music industry functionaries. '55 Visual
artists compete for shows and the attention of gallery owners.156
Every March and August, law professors inundate law review
editors with cord after cord of pulverized lumber, in an effort to
attract the attention of those who control access to high ranking
publications.'57 Selection is absolutely necessary because invest-
ments will not be made on works that are not likely to be well
received. Although copyright laws fully protect works of caterwaul-
ing, doodling, and doggerel, it is pointless to attempt to sell such
works to the public. Copyright law does not distinguish information-
wheat from information-chaff, but the agents of the industries
benefit from finding only the most commercially promising works to
produce and sell.
The significance of the selection agent's role can be seen in the
premium placed on the mechanics of selection in high-risk indus-
tries like pop music and movies. These industries are based on a
venture capital model of risky production: 58 no one knows what type
of content is going to be successful, so a large number of bets are
placed on various alternative products.'59 This is necessary because,
155. See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY ET AL., THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE
TO THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 11 (9th ed. 2003).
156. See generally CAROLL MICHEIS, How TO SURVIVE AND PROSPER AS AN ARTIST: SELLING
YOURSELF WITHOUT SELLING YOUR SOUL (5th ed. 2001) (providing techniques and ideas to
help artists begin a successful career).
157. See generally Roger C. Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Institution'" The American
Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 7-8 (1986) (discussing student editors' preferences in
selecting articles for publication in law reviews and student editors occasional failure to
recognize seminal articles); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of
Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926, 936, 948-49 (1990) (emphasizing the importance
of publication in law reviews for a professor seeking promotion, tenure, or prestige within the
legal profession).
158. See generally Tom Weidig, Towards a Risk Model for Venture Capital Funds: Liquidity
and Performance Forecasting (Working Paper, Nov. 2002), at http://papers.ssrn.coml
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=353562) (describing the venture capital process).
159. See, e.g., John Seabrook, The Money Note: Can the Record Business Survive?, THE NEW
YORKER, July 7, 2003, at 42, 45-46 (examining the music industry's business model and its




even with selection agents making their best bets, the majority of
films, books, and songs are commercial flops. Yet, one high-perform-
ing hit will more than cover the costs of a large number of
failures. 6 ° Optimizing the hit-to-flop ratio is the job of the selection
agent, and the high-stress and high-turnover of staff in these
industries are symptoms of an environment where, as William
Goldman says, "nobody knows anything" about what makes the
content successful, but they have to bet anyway. 6'
Of course, some industries are less affected by these kinds of
decisions than others. The ease of being selected for a given industry
is generally inversely proportional to the expense and risk that the
copyright intermediary will agree to bear in order to exploit the
content commercially. Getting a movie made is so expensive and
risky that selection in this industry is incredibly protracted, time-
consuming, and cautious.162 Music and novel publishing is slightly
expensive and risky, and selection involves choosing a small number
of works that appear to provide high probabilities of a high return
on investment. 163 At the other end of the spectrum, law review
publishing is underwritten by a combination of individual law school
contributions, income from Lexis and Westlaw, and law library
160. According to Seabrook's article in The New Yorker,
I asked Flom [an Atlantic Records executive in the music industry] whether he
thought hits might become less important to the record business. 'That ain't
gonna happen," he said. "If anything, hits can be more important than ever,
because you can make stars on a global scale now.... [Tihe day we stop seeing
hits is the day people stop buying records."
Id. at 46.
161. WILLIAM GOLDMAN, ADVENTURES IN THE SCREEN TRADE: A PERSONAL VIEW OF
HOLLYWOOD AND SCREEN WRITING 39 (1983).
162. See TAYLOR, supra note 154, at 72-75 (describing the pattern of caution undertaken
by movie executives to avoid losing their jobs). Of course there is nothing to say that the
expenditure of millions means a superior product to a cheaper work. As Douglas Wolk notes
in his dismissive commentary on The League of Extraordinary Gentlemen, a movie based on
an artistically and commercially successful graphic novel/comic, "[o]nce again, a cartoonist can
create for the price of a sheet of paper what a filmmaker may not be able to for millions."
Douglas Wolk, The Comic Book 'League' Was Better, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2003, at 18AR,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/13/movies/13WOLK.html?8mu.
163. Which is to say, simply, that the prospective return on investment needs to be greater
than that offered by alternative forms of investment at that level (or lower) of risk. If the
adjusted ROI calculated against risk is, say, less than that offered by a bank's insured
investments, then the rational investor will forego the pleasure of being a movie producer or
book publisher and put her money in the bank.
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subscriptions. 114 Therefore, in the absence of a bottom line other
than reputation, law review editors do not perform close calcula-
tions of risk and return with each article. Given the large number
of law reviews in the United States, the number of articles is nearly
equivalent to the number of slots for articles. Thus, most articles are
essentially guaranteed to be published somewhere. This explains
why law professors do not simply want to be published, but want to
be published by those journals that do not want to publish their
work. 168 In any event, it does not much matter how difficult it is for
an author to be selected. In all of the copyright industries, it
remains true that a small percentage of works that could be
produced and marketed are actually produced and marketed and
that someone, somewhere, is making decisions regarding whether
a given work is worth exploiting.
The vast majority of copyright-protected works today never move
past creation to the process of commercial selection. For instance,
most authors of email, diaries, snapshots, and children's birthday
videotapes do not seek out commercial exploiters of their creations.
164. Overall, a publication's total cost of production for publishing four issues per year is
approximately $45,000 per year. If the publication collects all of the subscribers' dues, it can
generate about $30,000 per year in revenue. The average publication also probably generates
anywhere from $5,000 to $10,000 in royalties from LEXIS and Westlaw. Bradley J.
Martineau, The Future of Law Reviews and Legal Journals from a Student Editor's
Perspective, 2 J. TECH. L. & POLy 1,1 15-16 (2002), at http://www.pitt.edu/-sorc/ techjournall
articlesVol2,1MARTINEAU.pdf. See generally Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing
the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615, 658 (1996) (noting that
copyright in law review articles dampens distribution by "making [access to articles] more
difficult and potentially more expensive to provide").
165. Or, as Groucho Marx put the corollary: "I don't care to belong to any club that will
accept me as a member." JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 693 (Justin Koplan ed., 16th
ed. 1992). See Hibbitts, supra note 164, at 175, 180 (discussing and discrediting the prestige
or "halo effect" that legal scholars obtain by publishing in "elite" law reviews). Today it seems
that law reviews, like everyone and everything else, need to be numerically ranked in
multiple dimensions. Such rankings are now important because society believes in their
importance. But what is the correct order? The Florida State Law Review attempted to
answer this question in a 1999 symposium, which discussed the ranking of specialized law
reviews. See Symposium, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 813 (1999), available at http://www.law.
fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/backissues/264.html. In the lead article, the authors devised a
formula to rank the reviews based on the prestige of the authors that published in them.
Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, An Empirical Evaluation of Specialized Law Reviews, 26
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 813, 826 (1999). This is a circular proposition. Obviously, ranking games




An equally large number of artists, composers, and authors work
diligently to develop their craft in their spare time, but never
actually submit their efforts to commercial exploiters. The number
of amateur musicians who fail to get a recording contract is dwarfed
by the number of those who never even try to get a recording
contract. This is usually explained by the author's presumption that
the works produced simply wouldn't pique the interests of commer-
cial exploiters. As a result, amateur creations have rarely entered
the commercial world of the copyright industries.
Selection is an investment decision. The agents who are perform-
ing the selection function-the screenplay readers and the movie
executives with greenlight power, the commissioning editors for
trade books and magazines, the artist and repertoire agents for the
pop music industry, and so on -- are engaged in making ex ante
guesses about the likely expost value of the content under consider-
ation. This structure makes perfect sense in industries where
valuable assets and resources have to be deployed to exploit the
content. Traditional copyright industries have finite resources that
have to be marshaled to bring works to the market. It is impossible
to publish all content available because only a fraction of content
would cover the cost of transferring that content to the individual
consumer.
Of course, the need for ex ante selection diminishes as the
resource constraints in production and dissemination are lowered.
If one can economically produce and deliver all content, then there
is no need to be selective. It might be predicted, then, that cheap
digital storage and transmission through distributed networks are
moving the traditional physical resource constraints toward zero.167
In an environment of zero-cost production and dissemination, it
makes much less sense to have a selection agent making ex ante
decisions about works which the general public might like to see.
It would make more sense to empower the individual consumer
166. See generally THE PLAYER (Fine Line Features 1992) (providing insight on movie
executives and the selection function); ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (Warner Brothers 1976)
(showing a vignette on commissioning editors and their role in selecting articles).
167. This is true for all of the functions here, which has in turn lead to the decentralization
opportunities.
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to choose from among a larger array of works that can be made
available at lower costs.
Even though digitization and the Internet reduce physical
resource constraints, there is another significant resource constraint
alleviated by selection agents: the constraint of time. An infinity of
mixed-quality works is much more frustrating than a set of pre-
selected high-quality works. The average individual will pay
someone else to screen out the worst and provide the best. The use
of trusted selection agents may generally increase selection
efficiency, if the aesthetic judgments of the selection agent can be
calibrated closely enough with the desires of the individual deciding.
Today, distributed selection is an emerging reality. In various
ways, distributed selection is replacing the past functions of the
entertainment industries by sifting through and prioritizing large
numbers of works. Increasingly, "social software" allows for the
profiling of personal preferences, the cross-indexing of those
preferences with data regarding the preferences of other similar
individuals, and thereby the relatively reliable prediction of future
preferences from among a field of works.
Perhaps the best known social software tool is Google, which
ranks the relevance of a given website by determining the number
of other sites that are linked to it.16 As Edward Felten has ex-
plained, "Google is not a mysterious Oracle of Truth but a numerical
scheme for aggregating the preferences expressed by web
authors." '169 Google operates as a means of filtering out the vast
panoply of irrelevant material, and it does so by collecting relevance
assessments made by other users.
This concept-capturing individual behaviors and preferences,
and finding algorithms to correlate preference groups and thereby
rank information relevance-is generally known as collaborative
168. A slightly more comprehensive explanation is that Google crawls the web every thirty
days or so, stores a cache of the pages it finds, and builds a lexicon of terms. For each term
it creates a list of pages that contain that term. A query for a given term returns that list,
sorted by Google "pagerank." Pagerank is computed based on the pageranks of the pages
linking to a document. See Sergey Brin & Lawrence Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale
Hypertextual Web Search Engine, 1 4.5.1, at http://www.cse.ogi.edu/-krasic/cse585/brin98
anatomy.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
169. Edward W. Felten, Googlocracy in Action, at http://www.freedom-to-tinker.coml
archives/000509.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
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filtering. 7 ' Collaborative filtering is nothing new. For instance, the
notion that good word of mouth drives up sales of movie tickets.
Billboard's listing of top singles and albums, or The New York
Times listings of best-sellers, are processes by which, to some
extent, the public casts votes to buoy the sales of information
products. Well-written collaborative filtering software, however,
can offer much more personalized and nuanced varieties of recom-
mendation.
The role of collaborative filtering is perhaps best described by the
name of one of the first systems, People Helping One Another Know
Stuff or PHOAKS.'71 The idea is to match a person-you, for
example-with people who are similar to you in meaningful ways
and who have rated or reacted to content previously. If we can
categorize you as belonging to a group-say a group that likes books
with particular subjects and themes-then the book ratings or book-
buying behaviors of other people in that group can be used to
recommend the information and entertainment you will find
appealing.'72 Familiar commercial examples include Tivo's sug-
gested broadcasts, Amazon's book recommendations, and Netflix's
movie recommendations. 17
3
Distributed selection is increasingly a more reliable predictor of
preferences than the traditional industry selection agents such as
commissioning editors or movie executives. Distributed selection is
real-time, individual-focused and resistant to the personal generali-
ties, inconsistencies, and information deficits that plague traditional
industry selection agents. The average selection agent makes a gut
reaction decision about the interest level in a particular market
or submarket. The algorithmic distributed selection agent makes
individualized predictions based on the end user's interests.
170. See Benkler, Freedom in the Commons, supra note 11, at 1259 (discussing Google as
a form of collaborative peer review and voting).
171. See http://www.cs.indiana.edu/-sithakur/1542_p3/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2004).
172. See Collaborative Filtering Workshop, Summary of Proceedings, University of
California, Berkeley (Mar. 16, 1996), at http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/resources/collab/collab-
report.html.
173. The systems are primarily automated, collaborative systems but have human
overrides. See Lisa Guernsey, E.Retailers Try to Make Intelligence a Bit Less Artificial, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2003, at G1, available at http://query.nytimes.comlgstlabstract.html?res=
FBOD12F934590C728CDDAC0894DB404482.
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Though Google, Amazon, Tivo, and Netflix might be the most
familiar examples of this type of distributed selection agent, we are
beginning to see a number of others in various content industries.
17 4
In the music field, for example, AudioScrobbler is a plug-in for
various music playing applications.175 In most MP3 playback
applications, you, the user, can rate music you like and dislike on a
five star scale.'76 You think Bjbrk's "Pagan Poetry" is sheer
poetry and rate it at five stars, but you think Britney Spears'
"Toxic" is, well, toxic and give it one star. Based on your ratings,
AudioScrobbler checks the playlists of other users and finds those
users whose rankings are most similar to yours. It then recommends
songs that these users rate highly but which are not in your
playlist.'77 A variant on this, named CommuniCast, was recently
outlined by Todd Larson. 7 ' The basic idea here is for a webcast; a
streaming radio system that is programmed using these sorts of
collaborative mechanisms. In this way listeners with similar
interests, as expressed by their playlist rankings, would form a
virtual radio station, streaming only the sorts of music they
commonly like.'79
In the text arena, decentralized selection is even more obvious;
consider blogs.'80 Weblogs demonstrate distributed selection
characteristics because each blog will usually have a "blogroll" or
list of other similar blogs, and will usually link to and respond to the
174. See, e.g., Clay Shirky, The Music Business and the Big Flip (suggesting ways
distributed selection might work in the music industry and its effect on A&R), at
http://shirky.com/ writings/music_flip.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
175. See About AudioScrobbler, at http://www.audioscrobbler.com/help/ (last visited Aug.
29, 2004).
176. See, e.g., iTunes: The Best Digital Jukebox, at http://www.apple.com/itunes/jukebox.
html (last visited Nov. 6, 2004).
177. See About AudioScrobbler, supra note 175.
178. See Todd Larson, CommuniCast: Developing a Community-Programmed Webcasting
Service (Working Paper, 2003), at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=490062.
179. Other examples of social software applications in the music field include MusicPlasma
(http://www.musicplasma.com/), MusicMobs (http://www.musicmobs.com), and WebJay
(http://webjay.orglabout). For a description of social listening practices that emerge as a
consequence, see Clay Shirky, The New Musical Functionality, Corante blog entry, at
http://www.corante.com/many/archives/2004/07/22/thenew-musical-functionality.php (last
visited Aug. 29, 2004).
180. Indeed some blogs are helpful in distributed selection of other content types. So, for
example, "Close Your Eyes" provides links and commentary on a range of sites that host music
or comment on music. See http://musik.antville.org/stories/676094/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
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posts in other like-minded blogs. Thus, if you like, for instance, the
right-wing musings of "Instapundit," then its blogroll will direct you
to the work of other conservative bloggers. There are various
mechanisms that allow this process to be performed and updated
automatically.181
This is a form of collaborative filtering, albeit a fairly simple
one.8 2 There are a number of other, more sophisticated, examples.
As Yochai Benkler has observed, the technology news and commen-
tary sites of Kuro5hin and Slashdot provide for a distributed
selection mechanism through their moderation process.'83 Any
posting on these sites is rated by multiple users, and an average
score is assigned to the posting. Other users can then set their
threshold, to see only those postings which are rated above a certain
level. The approach can be generalized beyond blogs and technology-
related websites. For example, Threadless.com adopts this approach
in the fashion industry: contributors submit t-shirt designs to
Threadless.com, and users both vote and comment on the designs.
Those designs which are rated above a certain level are then made
available for purchase by users."s In the film industry, a number of
sites developed by well known directors and actors allow the
aspiring screenwriter to post her screenplay and have it assessed by
other writers, industry players, and eventually, perhaps Kevin
Spacey and Francis Ford Coppola."s Although broad participation
in these types of opt-in voting and review mechanisms may seem
surprising, the American Idol show demonstrates that a large base
of people are actually interested in ranking and rating preferences
as a form of entertainment.' 6
181. For example, Technorati provides feedback on which blogs are linking to your blog and
allows for automatic inclusion of this information in your blog. See http://www.technorati.com/
(last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
182. Other examples within the blogosphere include Popdex, a website popularity index
(http://www.popdex.com/); Blogdex, an index of the "most contagious" blogs (http://blogdex.
net); and Daypop, a blog-based news and current events service (http://www.daypop.com/).
183. Benkler, Coase's Penguin, supra note 107, at 388-95; see also A. Michael Froomkin,
Toward a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 863-66 (2003) (discussing the
website Slashdot, which facilitates discourse without excluding unhelpful participation).
184. See http://www.threadless.com/help.php?sid= 9&aid=40 (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
185. See Trigger Street Productions, at http://www.triggerstreet.com/gbasefTrigger/
Homepage (last visited Sept. 6, 2004); see also America Zoetrope and Virtual Studio, at
http://www.zoetrope.com/about.cgi (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
186. See American Idol, at http://idolonfox.com/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
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This is not to say that distributed agents are necessarily better
than centralized agents. Technologies of distributed selection are
certainly subject to abuse by volunteers as well as capture by
marketing agendas.'87 It seems inevitable, however, that the
function of content selection in the future will likely be more socially
distributed. Central selection agents will lose their relative power
in much the same way that the proliferation of cable television
channels led to the decline of the social prominence of the three
major American broadcast networks. In situations where we can
actually compare centralized ex ante and decentralized ex post
selection directly-for example, the ex post distributed Google
search engine as contrasted with the ex ante centralized, human-
selected Yahoo! directory-the distributed agent seems to garner
greater market share because it works better."s The work of the
volunteer, amateur, and socially distributed Open Directory Project
is more comprehensive than the Internet directory produced by
Yahoo!.
As with the creation function, we see that distributed networks
are transforming the selection function. The conclusion here is
simple: traditional centralized ex ante selection increases costs and
decreases the total available content. Now that distributed selection
is possible, ex post selection among works by decentralized agents
seems to be a more socially beneficial alternative.
In summary, we offer two observations. First, the role of the
selection agent is becoming less important in light of the reduced
costs of dissemination. Second, the selection agent is becoming less
important in light of technologies of social software. It is possible
that free dissemination and social software will completely do away
with the need for centralized selection in the future.
187. See F. Gregory Lastowka, Search Engines Under Siege: Do Paid Placement Listings
Infringe Trademarks?, 13 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 6 (2002); F. Gregory Lastowka, Search
Engines, HTML, and Trademarks: What's the Meta For?, 86 VA. L. REV. 835, 835-84 (2000)
(discussing strategic manipulation of search engine rankings); Evan Hanson, FTC Wants Paid
Search to Shape Up, CNET News, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-940598.html (last
modified June 28, 2002) (discussing FTC concerns over the manipulation of search results
listing by search engines to favor business partners and advertisers).
188. See Hitwise Search Engine Ratings, at http://searchenginewatch.com/reportsarticle.
php/3099931 (May 17, 2004) (suggesting that as of April 2004, Google had a 50% greater




In the production function, someone invests in preparing a work
for the market. In the area of original oil paintings, this might just
mean finding a frame. The original copyrighted work is the relevant
object of consumption. Outside of that niche market, however,
production invariably entails the re-production of the work. Even in
broadcasting, a work must be reproduced in order to be exploited
commercially. So, in the case of film, a celluloid print is struck, in
the case of packaged software and music, the gold master compact
disk is produced and the consumer CDs are reproduced from this. In
book and magazine publishing, the text and graphics are typeset
and then multiple copies are made from this master version in one
of many different ways. Large scale commercial reproduction in
the past rewarded substantial capital investments such as the
purchase of expensive machinery capable of quickly and inexpen-
sively reproducing the original work onto other physical media.
Production also entailed the purchase of physical media which bore
the copies of the original work: paper, film stock, etc." 9
As is now well understood, however, the assumptions about
central control over production and reproduction of copyright
content have been profoundly altered over the last twenty years.
This began with the introduction of consumer reproduction technol-
ogy such as Xerox reprography, audio cassettes, and VCRs. The
introduction of these technologies occurred at a time when distrib-
uted creation and selection of content were not possible, and so we
think of these as "reproduction" devices. 9 ' However, in an environ-
ment where the other functions are decentralized, and where a
significant percentage of content is digitized, what we once thought
of as potential reproduction devices can now be seen as content
production devices.
The content production device known as the general purpose
computer is now found in a huge number of homes and offices;
189. See Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers and Public Goods: Trading Gold for Dross,
36 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 170 (2002); Ku, supra note 95, at 295 & n.221.
190. Of course from the perspective of the centralized players in the copyright industries
these are "unauthorized reproduction" technologies.
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it comes standard with disk drives sufficient to store untold
amounts of information; it has high-quality video devices to
display text, movies and images; it can be outfitted with paper
printers to print text, documents and images; and it inevitably
includes CD-ROMICD-R drives to play and copy music and data,
and DVD/DVD-ROM/DVD-R drives to play and copy movies.
Increasingly, with lightweight laptops and versatile PDAs like
Apple's iPod, the general purpose computer is becoming a mobile
and personalized technological accessory, much like the standard
eyeglasses and wristwatches of the twentieth century.191
This absence of intermediaries is a profound change, and one that
perhaps, as Jessica Litman has recently observed, has assumed the
status of a clich6. 192 The difference between the production function
before and after the introduction of the personal computer is
nowhere more evident than in the RIAA lawsuits. It was once the
case that consumers needed intermediaries such as the recording
industry for the production of music. The public needed the industry
to invest in producing copies because, among other things, individ-
ual consumers could not press their own vinyl. Later, consumers
could tape music, but this was time-consuming and there was some
loss in the quality of the work. Today, with the advent of perfect
digital copies, the public is willing to take over the production
function.'93 The music industry, which in the past only had to
pursue commercial operations with the means of mass-production,
has found itself struggling against the production capabilities of the
average home computer owner. 94
191. See generally HOWARD RHEINGOLD, SMART MOBS: THE NEXT SOCIAL REVOLUTION xiv-
xviii (2002) (describing the evolution of the personal computer and potential social changes
that our new-found inter-connectedness may soon bring).
192. See Litman, supra note 101, at 337; see also Ku, supra note 95, at 266-67; Liu, supra
note 3, at 409.
193. See Lenhart et al., supra note 9.
194. According to the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), it
pursues a global policy comprised of education, enforcement, developing
technologies, and when necessary, litigation.... [It] works with federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies and prosecutors' offices to coordinate seizures of
pirated product.... In cyberspace, the RIAA's team of Internet Specialists, with
the assistance of a 24-hour automated webcrawler, helps to stop Internet sites
that make illegal recordings available. Based on the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act's (DMCA) expedited subpoena provision, the RIAA sends out
information subpoenas as part of an effort to track and shut down repeat
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As described above, the Internet itself is a technology of produc-
tion. Each time a web page or blog is accessed, packets of data are
transported through the network to be reassembled on the
requesting system.1 Combining the production technology of the
Internet with the creative potential of the personal computer, one
can see why self-publishing now abounds. We have seen a
reduction in the cost of producing "vanity press" hardcopy editions
of our collected works,1" along with greater customization of the
content of these editions.197 The genius of cheaper, decentralized
production, however,198 is not just that those who otherwise would
publish can do so more cheaply, but that those who never considered
that they could publish are now free to do so, and are making the
most of this opportunity. 1" The "blogosphere," and the Internet
more generally, is simply the greatest advance in self-expression
and self-publishing that we have seen since the invention of the
printing press, and, based on the number of people involved, it is the
most democratic advance in individual publishing since the
invention of writing. 20
°
offenders and to deter ... those hiding behind the perceived anonymity of the
Internet.... Every year, by assisting in criminal trials and initiating civil
litigation, RIAA wins hundreds of guilty pleas from, or convictions of, music
pirates, plus scores of settlements and judgments. RIAA is also pioneering
copyright enforcement on the Internet.
What the RLAA Is Doing About Piracy, at http://www.riaa.com/issues/piracy/riaa.asp (last
visited Aug. 29, 2004).
195. See Information Science Institute, DARPA Internet Program, Transmission Central
Protocol, Protocol Specifications (providing a detailed overview of transmission central
protocol), at http://www.fggs.org/rfcs/rfc793.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
196. See Gayle Feldman, Got a Book in You? More Companies Than Ever Are Willing to Get
It Out, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2004, at C6, available at http://query.nytimes.com/searchl
abstract?res=F30D13FE3D5BOC728CDDAA0894DC404482.
197. See, e.g., Custombooks.com, at http://www.custombooks.com (last visited Sept. 15,
2004); Lulu, at http://www.lulu.com/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
198. And, of course, decentralized creation and selection which we have already discussed,
and decentralized dissemination, which we discuss in the next section.
199. See Lenhart et al., supra note 9.
200. The figures on this are notoriously hard to pin down, but at the beginning of 2004 it
was estimated that there were 4.1 million hosted blogs. See In Google We Trust, at
http://www.perseusdevelopment.comfblogsurvey/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2004). At the date of
writing, Google had 52.6 million pages indexed with the word "blog' in them. See
http://www.google.com/ search?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&q=blog&btnG=Google+Search
(search run Aug. 29, 2004). A 2004 survey found that between two and seven percent of U.S.
Internet users were blogging. See Lenhart et al., supra note 9. Against this, there were
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It is worth noting that the revolution of the blogosphere did not
occur because consumers suddenly became professional authors or
creators. While it is possible that more people are spending more
time today writing music or making films, the primary change is
that these creative activities are now being published on a daily
basis. They are also increasingly being found through the technology
of search engines and other collaborative filtering technologies.
Outside the change in individual production that has emerged,
digital networks allow the collective actions of volunteers contribut-
ing time and effort to replace the commercially motivated models of
the past.201 The grandfather of this sort of distributed, non-creative,
textual production is Project Gutenberg. It was created by Michael
Hart in 1971 in order to provide a free Internet library of electronic
versions of books that were in the public domain." 2 A group of
amateurs began to scan and distribute these books. This spawned
other, related efforts such as Gutenberg-equivalents for Hebrew °3
and Nordic texts,2"4 and a version for public domain sheet music." 5
This model of distributed amateur efforts at information sharing
has also been applied in other contexts. Take, for example, the
canonical database of information about the contents of compact
discs. Initially called CDDB, but now renamed Gracenote, this
database is the source of the track listings that appear when you
insert a CD into your computer. °6 It compiled its comprehensive
listings from individuals who cheerfully re-typed the liner notes
somewhere over 52,000 reporters. See U.S. Department of Labor, 1998 National Occupational
Employment and Wage Estimates, at http://www.bls.gov/oes/1998/oesnat98.htm (last visited
Sept. 6, 2004).
201. See Benkler, Coase's Penguin, supra note 107, at 371; Boyle, supra note 11, at 44.
202. Wikipedia, Project Gutenberg, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ProjectGutenberg (last
visited Aug. 29, 2004).
203. See Wikipedia, Project Ben.Yehuda, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ProjectBen-
Yehuda (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
204. See Wikipedia, Project Runeberg, at http://en.wikipedia.orglwiki/ProjectRuneberg
(last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
205. See Wikipedia, Mutopia Project, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutopia-project (last
visited Aug. 29, 2004).
206. Assuming that you are connected to the Internet at the time you insert the CD, your
music client reads the serial number from the CD, checks this number against the numbers
stored in Gracenote, and returns the data about the album title, artist, and track names. See
Gracenote CDDB: Music Recognition Service, at http://www.gracenote.com/gn-products/
cddb.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2004).
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for each CD they placed in the CD-ROM drive. A similar process
occurred with the enormous Internet Movie Database, IMDB.com,
which initially derived its directory of movies from information
provided by Internet users. °7
We can therefore see that the production function, like the
creation and selection functions, can be significantly decentralized
and amateurized by distributed networks. Within the sphere of
social information practices, the production of works has moved
from being the primary market function performed by the copyright
industry into a largely transparent feature of the Internet and
distributed networks.
4. Dissemination
Dissemination has historically entailed the distribution of copies
of works to outlets for purchase. Physical distribution beyond one's
immediate sphere invariably requires the coordination of supply
chains. Bookstores and newsstands are the most obvious examples
of text-publishing industry supply chains. All copyright industries
in the era before the Internet required dissemination mechanisms.
Film required shipment of celluloid stock, music was shipped on
vinyl discs, and so on. As discussed previously, the Internet
revolutionized distribution at the same time it revolutionized
production. Ten years ago, when John Perry Barlow wrote his
article in Wired, he talked about how the Internet would affect
dissemination.0 8 Since that time, the model of dissemination has
become even more decentralized as we have witnessed the develop-
ment of peer-to-peer networks like Napster, Gnutella, FastTrack,
FreeNet, and, most recently, BitTorrent.0 9 As others have de-
scribed, these technologies might be said to mirror the information
network structure of the Internet generally: they move away from
centralized nodes of information production, toward distributed,
variable-path models without any clear center.21 Numerous
207. See Encyclopedia: IMDB, at http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/IMDB (last
visited Aug. 29, 2004).
208. Barlow, supra note 16.
209. See John Borland, File Swapping Shifts up a Gear, CNET NEWS, May 27, 2003, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1026-1009742.html.
210. See Riehl, supra note 105, at 1764-65.
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scholars have documented the extraordinary increase in the ease of
information dissemination as a result of these networks, and we
need sketch only the most obviously relevant features of the change
in dissemination.211
First, with the increase in the size of hard disks, the expansion
of bandwidth, distributed indices and servers,2 12 and encrypted
transmission,21' dissemination is becoming ever-more decentralized
and ever-more incapable of central control. Originally network
architectures provided for relatively decentralized dissemination at
the nodes of the network but still retained the possibility of central
control. We can see this in the copyright-infringement cases
involving networks during the early 1990s; the networks all
involved bulletin board systems (BBSs)." 4 It was possible for
industry actors to stop infringement simply by targeting the
infringer of copyright who was the system operator of the central
BBS server. In shutting down the server, the industry actor shut
down the leaf nodes. The development of the Internet necessarily
involved a decentralization of control, but only in the general
transmission protocol of the network.215 At the application layer it
was possible, and sometimes necessary, for a significant degree of
centralized control to be applied. Thus, even though Napster was
billed as a peer-to-peer, that is to say, highly decentralized, file-
sharing network, the system was highly centralized at the index
level. In order for Napster to work as it did, it was necessary for the
company to retain central control of the index of user collections. Of
course, Napster's centralized index represented the hub around
which all illicit MP3 dissemination took place, and it was therefore
the basis of the RIAA's attack and the eventual court decisions in its
favor.216 Once Napster was destroyed, it was replaced with Kazaa,
211. See supra notes 100.08 and accompanying text.
212. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1041 (C.D. Cal.
2003).
213. See, e.g., Riehl, supra note 105, at 1781.83 (describing FreeNet's encrypted file system
and the problems it poses for copyright enforcement).
214. See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v, Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (order
granting preliminary injunction), amended 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (same); Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding liability for secondary
infringement by proprietors of a BBS).
215. See Information Science Institute, supra note 195.
216. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records
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Gnutella, and other FastTrack based file-sharing systems, all of
which are decentralized as to indexing as well as distribution,217
making them much harder to control centrally.2 18 The most recent
step has been the development of BitTorrent,21 9 which goes one step
further in the decentralization of file-sharing by connecting any file
request to multiple users who have the file.220 This distributes the
load across multiple hosts on the network.221 Thus, decentralization
continues to creep deeper into the network level of the file-sharing
protocols.
In addition to the evolution in the structure of distributed
networks, the applications that use distributed dissemination are
proliferating all the time. At one point we were only concerned
about the transfer of packets from one computer to another. Then
came the sharing of files, at which time the major protocol was
file transfer protocol or FTP.22 Not long after, we saw widespread
adoption of the protocols for electronic mail and web pages.223
More recently, the distributed dissemination of information has
been posted in blog pages. The protocol for this, RSS,224 allows
v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
217. See Tyler T. Ochoa, 1984 and Beyond. Two Decades of Copyright Law, 20 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 167, 177 (2003) (examining the different network architectures
of the various systems).
218. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1041 (C.D.
Cal. 2003) (finding no contributory infringement by providers of file-sharing software that
played no continuing role in facilitating exchange of files between users).
219. BitTorrent software is available at http://bitconjurer.org(BitTorrent/ (last modified
Apr. 4, 2004), and the mechanism by which it works is explained at http://bitconjurer.orgt
BitTorrent/introduction.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
220. See, e.g., Borland, supra note 209; Paul Boutin, Caveat MPAA, SLATE (Feb. 27, 2004),
at http://slate.msn.com/id/2096316/.
221. Of course, though the emphasis has been on illicit filesharing, BitTorrent is agnostic
as to type of data transferred and it is increasingly being used for sharing of legally-
reproducible content, business material, and so forth. See John Borland, Legal P2P Networks
Gaining Ground, CNET NEWS (Mar. 11, 2004), at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5172564.
html.
222. See generally D.J. Bernstein, FTP: File Transfer Protocol (describing how FTP works),
at http://cr.yp.to/ftp.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
223. See TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE
DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR (1999) (discussing the advent of E-mail).
224. The acronym RSS is said to stand for "Really Simple Syndication" or sometimes "RDF
Site Summary." See, e.g., RSS 2.0 Specifications, Technology at Harvard Law, at http://blogs.
law.harvard.edu/tech/rss (last visited June 19,2004); What Does RSS Stand For?, Answerbag,
at http://www.answerbag.com/q..view.php/772 (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
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"newsfeeds" to be established for all blogs, thereby providing for
decentralized dissemination of news and other current information.
Ten years ago, a revolution in decentralized dissemination of
content was forecast.225 This prediction is now coming true. The
irony, of course, is that the widespread development of such systems
is driven by the litigation strategy of the RIAA. Whatever the reason
for the development of these systems, though, it is clear that
decentralized dissemination of content is the distribution mecha-
nism of the present and the future. The dissemination function,
however, only deals with getting the content out to the consumers.
The consumers still have to be made aware of the content and be
convinced that they need it. This is the role of the promotion
function.
5. Promotion
Although the creation, selection, production, and dissemination
of content were all necessary functions in the commercial industry
of copyright, they were not sufficient. Arguably, the most important
factor in the business of copyright has always been promotion. For
a work to succeed, individual consumers need somehow to be made
aware of the work's existence. More importantly, they need to decide
that their lives would be better if the work, or access to the work,
were purchased.
In the past, the process of selection and the process of promotion
were separate processes, both temporally and strategically. The
work of a selection agent was to find the diamonds in the rough,
while the promoter was a specialist in selling diamonds, cubic
zirconium, or whatever else was on hand. The genius of the
entertainment industry has not been in selecting Britney Spears
over a million wannabes. Britney Spears qua musician is little
different from those who competed with her on Star Search so many
years ago. What is responsible for Britney Spears' current place in
society is a well-oiled celebrity promotion apparatus. It is often
sophisticated promotion, not the qualities of the artist or the work,
that generates the revenues in commercial copyright markets.
225. See Barlow, supra note 16.
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The importance of the promotion function to copyright industries
is hard to overstate, but it is ignored in almost all accounts of
copyright.226 The greatest works of art, music, and writing are not
socially significant if the public is unaware of their existence.
Indeed, the marriage of marketing to copyright has fueled the
explosion of value in copyright today. Witness how Disney has wed
a diversified copyright portfolio with synchronized marketing
efforts, transforming works into brands used to sell action figures,
fast food, sleepwear, and vacations, which in turn re-popularize the
copyright work. "Brand licensing" is one of the success stories of the
entertainment industry during the latter half of the twentieth
century.227
The promotion function is not simply about generating hype by
flashing the product before eyeballs at every conceivable opportu-
nity. There is certainly some of that, but the promotion function is
more interesting than the story told by simple left-leaning critiques
of Madison Avenue and Hollywood. The promotion function must
overcome real limits on consumer time and interest that challenge
the commercial success of most content. In order to do this, promot-
ers have to leverage reputational capitals and cultural associations
in complex ways. As discussed above in relation to collaborative
filtering, works are often associated with particular sets of prefer-
ences and interests. Subtle trademarks and partnerships can
therefore have significant persuasive effects on consumers.
Some promotional activities go unrecognized by consumers. For
instance, publishing companies maintain separate imprints for
different varieties of content. These imprints accrue brand recogni-
226. Nadel does mention it as one of the costs of copyright, though he terms it "marketing"
and its scope is correspondingly narrower than that presented here. See Nadel, supra note 86.
227. Of course, brand licensing incorporates aspects of both trademark and copyright, and
the relationship between them is an interesting one. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter
Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1497-
1500 (2002) (examining the synergies created between disparate intellectual property
regimes, including trademark and copyright); F. Gregory Lastowka, The Trademark Function
of Authorship (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors) (discussing the trademark
function of authorial attribution). For a criticism of the extent of brand protection and the
creation of properties in the brand itself, see, for example, Mark A. Lemley, The Modern
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1705-09 (1999); Jessica
Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J.
1717, 1731-35 (1999).
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tion for the type and quality of the works published there. The
imprints "Prentice-Hall," "The Financial Times," and "Penguin" are
well-known imprimaturs of style and quality in, respectively, college
textbooks, business news, and trade paperback books. Yet they are
actually all just brands of one company, Pearson.22 Publication of
any work within these imprints, or within any other imprint owned
by another company, provides a promotion signal that the new work
is of a nature that consumers of previous content in that imprint
like.229
Likewise, many types of serial works, such as magazines or
journals, carry a strong promotional signal: if you liked the June
issue of Cat Fancy, you will probably like the July issue of Cat
Fancy. A similar mechanism is at work in small record labels, where
particular labels such as Def Jam Records or Rhino Records, for
example, become associated with particular styles of music.23° As
in text publishing imprints, these are often brands of larger
music labels. For instance, Vivendi's Universal Music Group owns
MCA Nashville, Polydor, Island Def Jam, Decca, Geffen Records,
Interscope A&M Records, and Dreamworks Records, whereas
Bertelsmann owns Arista Records, BMG, RCA, Jive Records, Epic
Records, and Windham Hill.231 Obviously, Jive and Windham Hill
benefit from not being synonymous with Arista Records, and instead
228. See Pearson PLC, at http://www.pearson.com/about/glance.htm (last visited Aug. 28,
2004).
229. This can be seen in the branding of the producers of copyright content. Penguin has
a particular brand, as has Miramax films, and so on. The brands are recognizable by the
consuming public as a result of the signals sent by previous copyright content, as well as by
marketing, advertising, and so forth. See Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark
Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 642-45 (2004) (examining trademarks and branding from a
semiotic perspective).
230. Def Jam is a well-known hip-hop label. See Def Jam Records, at http://www.
defiam.coml (last visited Aug. 28, 2004). Rhino specializes in re-releases of music that other
labels consider unprofitable. See Rhino Records, at http://www. rhino.com/ (last visited Aug.
28, 2004).
231. See Universal Music Group, at http://www.vivendiuniversal.com/vu/en/subsidiaries/
u_music. cfm (last visited Nov. 6, 2004); Sony BMG Music Entertainment, at http://www.
bertelsmann.com/divisionsbmglabelallabels.cfm (last visited Nov. 6, 2004); PBS, Media




benefit by sending divergent signals to consumers about the content
that bears their respective imprints.232
Beyond this intra-company brand differentiation, various
copyright industries engage in other types of activities as part of
their promotion function. In the popular music business, the singer,
promoter, and music label promote the content with music videos,
concert tours, live radio appearances, and magazine interviews. The
promotion function is primarily about finding a mechanism with
which to connect potential consumers to content they are inter-
ested in using. In the development of copyright, promotion is
probably the most important function when it comes to distinguish-
ing the successful exploitation of commercial copyright content
from the unsuccessful. One would think that this would not have
changed with the advent of the personal computer and the Internet.
Centralized copyright-based firms like Pearson or Sony still rely on
television, radio, billboards, direct mailings, and other types of
expensive marketing in order to convince consumers that the
owner's content matches the consumers' interests. Thus, one might
predict that the amateur content available in free digital formats
will never manage to compete for social prominence with the
musical works of Britney Spears.
However, we have begun to see the decentralization and conse-
quent amateurization of the promotion function. In fact, decen-
tralization leads to the merging of the selection and promotion
functions. Consider the above discussion about how selection no
longer need be performed by centralized agents, but can occur
through distributed recommendation techniques such as collabo-
rative filtering and social software mechanisms. 233 These personal-
ized recommendations actually may take the place of promotional
activities. Consider a starting position where content is posted to a
vast, undifferentiated abstract space. Assuming resource con-
straints as to time, how can a user discover which content she
wants, short of looking at everything? In a centralized content
regime, the two functions, selection and promotion, separate out the
content that she does not need, or cannot have under the resource
constraints of centralization. Under centralization, the selection of
232. See Beebe, supra note 229, at 642-45.
233. See supra Part II.A.2.
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valuable content occurs by the editorial department and the
promotion occurs by the marketing department. The two functions
are, however, conceptually identical because they involve deter-
mining ex ante what the consumer will want; despite appearing
separate by virtue of their temporal separation.
Under the conditions of decentralization that distributed
networks are beginning to create, all content can be posted, and no
centralized selection or promotion is necessary. Amateur actors will
take the role of promoters of content in the time honored way: they
will recommend it to their friends. Just as we saw for the selection
function, social software can take the place of advertising, special-
ized imprints, and even critics. The rating of a particular movie,
book, or article by people who are just like you is a much better
mechanism of promotion than any of the tools that centralized
actors have at their disposal.
Thus, all of the examples given above for the amateur selection
function apply to promotion. Of course, truly decentralized promo-
tion is not yet possible, but some interesting examples are already
apparent. The review function in Amazon is one instance where
individuals are, essentially, promoting content in a decentralized
manner."' Generalizing this process outside books, we can see
the emergence of virtual communities who recommend content
to each other. These communites started with Usenet and list
servers, expanded through Yahoo! Clubs, and are now becoming the
blogosphere. Distributed recommendation systems-like Ryze.. or
234. See Amazon.corn, at http:I/www.amazon.com. The importance of these reviews as
examples of decentralized promotion can be seen in the importance that authors place on
them, even to the point that they will post fake reviews.
Close observers of Amazon.com noticed something peculiar this week: the
company's Canadian site had suddenly revealed the identities of thousands of
people who had anonymously posted book reviews on the United States site
under signatures like "a reader from New York." The weeklong glitch, which
Amazon fixed after outed reviewers complained, provided a rare glimpse at how
writers and readers are wielding the online reviews as a tool to promote or pan
a book-when they think no one is watching.
Amy Harmon, Amazon Glitch Unmasks War of Reviewers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at Al,
available at http:Ifquery.nytimes.comfgstfabstract.html?res-F30D11FD345EOC778DDDAB
0894DC404482.
235. See Ryze (offering online business and social networking), at www.ryze.com (last
visited Aug. 28, 2004).
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Epinions236 -have been built to express opinions on all manner of
content. This means that one can find interactive communities of
specialists who are devoted to any topic and provide expert opinions
on all manner of content. This may seem something less than a
paradigm shift, but to understand it in centralized copyright terms,
consider how it might feel to have fifty people in each section of the
bookstore, record shop, or movie theater who do nothing but assess
the content and offer advice to others. Connected to collaborative
filtering, this type of approach would mean that consumers can
adopt the opinions of the experts or aficionados who share their
interests exactly.
We can therefore see that the promotion function will be signifi-
cantly affected by distributed networks. A distributed, amateur
selection function can fulfill the same social purpose that was
previously performed by the centralized selection and promotion
functions. While this hardly means that works will no longer be
promoted, it means that social software may become a new promo-
tional instrument which will be more diversified and less suscepti-
ble to commercial capture.
6. Purchase and Use
The act of purchase, in the traditional theory of copyright,
provides the incentive for creation and also manages to subsidize
the former five processes. It consists of a standard sale to the end
user. In exchange for cash,237 a consumer acquires the right to
access a work. Generally this takes the form of the physical
acquisition of some medium containing the content, such as a CD,
DVD, or book. Purchase can, however, in some instances, be
unrelated to the acquisition of physical media. In the case of movies,
museums, and concert performances, it is clear that all the con-
236. See Epinions (offering online user reviews of products, services, and entertainment),
at www.epinions.com (last visited Aug. 28, 2004).
237. This is not to say that cash is strictly necessary for the purchase process. What we are
speaking about is the process by which the content is passed to the person who will ultimately
experience it by reading, listening, or viewing. In some cases the copyright-protected work is
delivered to the consumer without any requirement of payment. The most obvious examples
of this type of "purchase" would be advertising and propaganda. See Lastowka, supra note 5,
at 294-96.
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sumer is getting for her cash is a right to experience the content
(albeit in air conditioned comfort, perhaps with a bag of popcorn the
size of her head bought from a concession stand).
With the proliferation of peer-to-peer systems, many commenta-
tors have weighed in on methods by which people within the
copyright industry might be paid. These methods include levies on
computer systems,23 online tip jars,239 electronic equivalents of
busking,2 40 a return to the system of artistic patronage,24' and
earning money through public performance with the online content
acting as promotional material.242
These approaches are innovative and interesting, and they
provide evidence that a decentralized purchase function will not
necessarily look like a typical retail transaction for a CD or DVD. In
fact we do not even need to go as far as any of these examples to see
that the purchase function is possible, and easy, for decentralized
actors. Purchase involves payment and delivery. Online payment
has been a standard practice for five years. The dot com explosion
and the rise of electronic commerce demonstrates how simple it
is for purchases to be made via the Internet,2 43 and there are
now numerous providers of electronic commerce services for
238. Seegenerally Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy toAllow Free
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003).
239. See, e.g., Amazon.com, What is the Amazon Honor System? (discussing Amazon's
implementation), at http://sl.amazon.com/exec/varzea/subst/fx/help/payor-faq.html/ (last
visited Aug. 28, 2004); The GPF Tip Jar (providing users with a method of supporting a site's
online comic strips), at http://www.gpf-comics.com/tips.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2004). But
see The Future of Music Coalition, The Online Tip Jar Experiment, (criticising the use of those
tipjars for music), at http://www.futureofmusic.org/articles/tipjarcritique.cfm. (Oct. 15, 2000).
240. See John Kelsey & Bruce Schneier, The Street Performer Protocol and Digital
Copyright, FIRST MONDAY, at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_6/kelsey/ (June 1999).
241. See, e.g., William Gibson, "Digital Day", Address to Directors Guild of America, Los
Angeles (May 17, 2003), available at http://www.williamgibsonbooks.com/archive/2003-
05_01_archive.asp#200322370.
242. The experience of The Grateful Dead is always invoked here. See, e.g., Barlow, supra
note 16. A more recent example is the band Phish, which adopts a similar ethos. See, e.g., Seth
Schiesel, Seeing Payday, Not Piracy, Musicians Put Concerts on the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22,
2004, at G1, G7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/O1/22/technology/circuits/22band.
html.
243. See generally WILLIAMS. DAVIS& JOHNBENAMATI, E-COMMERCEBASICS: TECHNOLOGY




individuals.244 We can therefore say with confidence that the
payment component of the purchase function is available to
decentralized players. As the delivery function for online content
already occurs via the network, it presents no problem. As a result,
these days purchase is an activity which can occur in a completely
decentralized manner.
The final function in the content chain is use, the experience
and/or manipulation of the content by the purchaser. It might
appear strange to include this function at all, as the commercial
exploitation of a copyright product would seem to begin with
creation and end with purchase. Use is, however, an integral aspect
of the commercial life-cycle of copyright content.
If one sees use as merely a passive reception of the content,
nothing has changed. However, if one sees use as adapting, re-
transmitting, modifying, or otherwise building upon the content,
much has changed. In essence, whereas the "use" stage of copyright
in the past was when a proclamation reached the public, the "use"
stage in a decentralized amateur-to-amateur model is merely the
beginning of a conversation. The amateur end user may become the
amateur re-creator or re-distributor.245
B. Decentralization and Revolution
As we have demonstrated above, the functions that are funda-
mental to central control over copyright have migrated to the
edges of the system, to the amateurs who create the content and the
amateurs who use the content. In the sections that follow we
examine two issues that emerge from this movement towards
amateurization: why some industries are disproportionately affected
by the move towards the amateur-to-amateur environment; and
whether this is inevitably a destructive force for these industries.
244. A search on Google for "E-commerce shopping cart" returns 2,540,000 hits for
numerous providers of online shopping systems. See http://www.google.com/search?q=e-
commerce+shopping+cart (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
245. See supra Part II.A.1; see also Liu, supra note 3, at 406-20 (discussing more active
approaches to the theory of consumer "use").
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1. Dead Industries
With all the attention paid to copyright and music on the
Internet, it is easy to forget that, in terms of net transfers of
material protected by copyright, the peer-to-peer infringing transfer
of music files is really an exceedingly small fraction of Internet
traffic today. By far the most prevalent copyright exchanges are
copies of texts, images, and computer programs. The World Wide
Web is constructed out of these components. Practically all web
pages, however, are provided by the copyright holder with the
express intention that the material be copied by others on the
network. Since 1995, copyright-related activity on the Internet has
mainly been a trade in text, images, and software protected by
copyrights that are not usually registered or enforced.
The problem with Napster was not that original and creative
material protected by copyright law was being exchanged on a
massive scale: this is essentially the definition of the World Wide
Web in practice. Nor was the problem with Napster that Sean
Fanning and the legions of Napster users had less respect for
musical copyrights than, say, motion picture copyrights.24 The real
problem was that the centrifugal pressures leading to decentraliza,
tion disproportionately affected music because of the way it was
disseminated and consumed.
Twenty years ago, one might have surmised that the market for
texts, not the market for sounds, would be the copyright market
most vulnerable to erosion by unauthorized digital distribution.
Even in the 1980s, a 200-page popular paperback novel could have
easily fit on one of the floppy diskettes that were widely available.
It didn't happen then, and even today peer-to-peer markets for
Harry Potter books are almost non-existent,247 whereas the piracy
of digital music is so widespread that some commentators suggest
246. This argument is the favored theory of so-called copynorm scholars. See Wikipedia,
Copynorms, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copynorm (last visited Sept. 6, 2004). The
argument is that certain norms of copying exist that differ depending on which type of content
is being reproduced, and that the social approbation against, say, copying music is lower than
it is against copying visual art.
247. We are not suggesting that scanning a Harry Potter book is impossible-indeed it has
apparently been done, and Harry Potter books are being traded via peer-to-peer systems. We
simply suggest that it happens less frequently than one might believe from first principles.
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that the music industry is dead. Why is it that some content
industries are so affected by decentralization and others are not?
There are some obvious differences between various content
industries that lead to differences in the effects of the trend towards
decentralization and amateurization. Contrast musical recordings
and books. Even though the text of a work of fiction could have fit
on a floppy disk in the 1980s, books have never been widely
distributed in digital versions that a personal computer could
interpret. The sale of music on compact discs, beginning in the mid-
1980s, combined with the widespread inclusion of compact disc
drives on computers, beginning in the mid-1990s, effectively sealed
the fate of the music industry. Today's file-sharing programs like
Kazaa and Morpheus are essentially just dissemination artifacts
from CD sales. While compression and file-sharing software
certainly play a part in these markets, they are really the last tiny
link in a long chain. The aftermarkets in MP3 files could have never
been effective if file-sharing via MP3s had not been remarkably
easy, especially given that those fueling the market receive no
remuneration and bear the risk of lawsuits. The answer to "why
music?" is that the decentralized functions for the exploitation of
music were already integrated into personal computers by the
1990s, and the native format of music distribution (i.e. compact
discs) provided the casual user with all she needed to distribute
widely.
In general, technological advances will certainly increase
decentralized activity, such as file-sharing, over the long term. For
instance, perhaps at some point the chore of creating a digital copy
of a Harry Potter book will be substantially lessened through
advances in scanning devices and optical character recognition. And
perhaps new compression schemes, faster broadband connections,
and decryption software will make the often-reported incidents of
peer-to-peer movie-sharing something more than a boogeyman that
appears primarily in the press. Certainly the increasingly wide-
spread use of more powerful digital cameras, scanners, and camera
phones will increase unauthorized copyright aftermarkets for
images.
As for movies, it is clear that their path follows that mapped out
by the music industry. Movies are released in digital format on
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DVDs. Once network bandwidth and disk storage capacity catches
up with them, the movie industry will follow the music industry into
a death-spiral of copyright infringement actions, finger-pointing,
and recriminations.
Which brings us neatly to the issue of whether decentralization
is necessarily a destructive force for content.
2. The Big Shift
The discussion above draws attention to two seemingly inconsis-
tent concepts. Decentralization seems to provide opportunities for
individual creativity. This will lead to more content and is a wholly
good thing. Against this, we have the specter of the music industry
and seemingly the wholesale evisceration of the industry as a
consequence of a number of these decentralized functions applying
to music. Surely this will lead to significantly less content. Thus, at
first blush, these two observations don't seem to be reconcilable.
For the most part, however, it is clear that they are. At least
where content is created by one or two individual creators, it is
evident that decentralization of all content functions leads to a
much greater proliferation of expressive content. It is often joked
that everyone has a book in them. With decentralized content
functions, not only does everyone have a book in them, everyone can
write that book, produce it, distribute it, and have it selected and
used by that tiny subset of the population who would really love it.
The story is somewhat more complicated when it comes to large-
scale creative endeavors. The music industry is one example that
has already been hard hit by decentralization, but movies are even
more troubling. With the average cost of a studio movie now in the
tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions, of dollars, it seems that
decentralization will spell the end of Hollywood-variety movie-
making, since file-sharing will destroy the movie industry's revenue
model.
Surprisingly, this doesn't follow at all. Though today's movie
industry may falter, we now have significant evidence that firms
and industries are no longer necessary for the creation of extraordi-
narily complicated and otherwise expensive creative objects. Open
source software, like Linux, Apache, or MySQL, provides the model
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for distributed production of complex creative objects. 248 It costs
Microsoft untold hundreds of millions of dollars to produce an
operating system; yet the use of open source methods means that a
superior operating system can be built by amateurs collaborating
around the world using the network.2 49 There are, by now, a
sufficient number of examples of this type of open source creativity,
in areas including software, newspapers,' 0 and commentary,5 1 for
us to conclude that this type of organization can supplant the firm
in the production of complex creative objects.25 2 This is not to say
that the firm is necessarily dead, but rather, we have witnessed the
emergence of a new form of social and community organization
which can produce objects that once were the province solely of the
centralized, heavily-capitalized industries.
This leads us to question the primacy of firms and industries
which rely on copyright. Copyright industry firms are not self-
evident axioms, nor do they come from God. They exist because of
historically contingent facts that meant that centralization of
content functions was the only way that creative material could
move from creator to user. William Gibson charted this historical
contingency in discussing the rise and fall of musicians and the
music industry:
Prior to the technology of audio recording, there was relatively
little one could do to make serious money with music. Musicians
could perform for money, and the printing press had given rise
to an industry in sheet music, but great fame, and wealth,
tended to be a matter of patronage. The medium of the commer-
cial audio recording changed that, and created industry predi-
248. See Benkler, Coase's Penguin, supra note 107, at 371-74.
249. The following quote is printed on a T-shirt available on the Think Geek website:
"Linux: Il y a moins bien, mais c'est plus cher." Think Geek, at http://thinkgeek.com/
oreilly/tshirts/5bc4/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
250. See Daniel Cooney, Influential South Korean Internet Site Uses "Citizen Reporters" to
Cover News, SFGATE.COM, May 13, 2003, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.
cgi?f=/news/archive/2003/05/13/international 0144EDT0417.DTL; Leander Kahney, Citizen
Reporters Make the News, WIRED, May 17, 2003, available at http://www.wired.com/news/
culture/0,1284,58856,00.html; Terdiman, supra note 15; Clive Thompson, Blogs & News =
Citizen Reporters, Collision Detection, May 15, 2003, available at http://www.
collisiondetection.net/mt/archives/000365.html#000365.
251. See Benkler, Coase's Penguin, supra note 107, at 393-95.
252. See id. at 426.
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cated on an inherent technological monopoly of the means of
production. Ordinary citizens could neither make nor manufac-
ture audio recordings. That monopoly has now ended .... The
window, then, in which one could become the Beatles, occupy
that sort of market position, is seen to have been technologically
determined.263
We need to remember that, from the perspective of society at
large, the content industries don't matter in and of themselves.
What matters is the social benefit in having creative content within
our society. The destruction of copyright industries would be a
terrible thing if, and only if, they represented the sole means that
creative content could be generated. As we have seen, however,
amateur-to-amateur functions now provide individuals with the
opportunity to express themselves, and society has already bene-
fited greatly from this expanded content generation. The next few
years promise to provide even greater opportunities for this sort of
content. As a result, society as a whole is likely to be better off if we
allow for widespread decentralization of all content functions.
Of course, copyright industries won't see it this way and will
likely seek to use copyright law to forestall decentralization. The
question that remains, then, is what should be our normative
response to the descriptive challenge laid down by decentralization?
Copyright's exclusive solicitude for centralized and commercial
players is an increasingly astigmatic approach toward the regula-
tion of social information practices. In Part III below, we therefore
examine the implications of this change for the incentive story of
copyright and the structural features of copyright law.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH COPYRIGHT
The amateur-to-amateur trend in content information practices
calls into question copyright's claim to the central role in structur-
ing the information environment. Due to the increasing ease of
content creation, selection, and distribution through distributed
networks, we can see the emergence of a separate amateur sphere
of content production, providing public benefits that were previously
253. Gibson, supra note 241.
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provided only by profit-driven enterprises. Yet copyright law has
essentially disregarded the contributions of amateurs and concen-
trated instead on creating incentives for the profit-driven informa-
tion production practices of the traditional content industries.
A variety of reasons explain the current dismissal of amateur
creativity. Part of it might simply be ignorance on the part of
legislators who are unfamiliar with the rise of the opportunities of
decentralized networks and amateur production. Part of it might be
due to conservatism regarding the role of copyright law. It may well
be due to legislative capture by lobbyists and campaign fund raisers.
It may be partly explained by the cognitive dissonance that would
inevitably result from recognizing the value of subsidizing the
practices of amateur creation and redistribution while simulta-
neously holding the view that copyright's proprietary incentives are
essential for the production of valuable new works.
Despite our pessimism about legislative and administrative
solicitude for amateur practices, we are certain that decentralized
amateur-to-amateur information practices are ascendant and will
continue to grow in importance. At some juncture, Congress and the
Copyright Office will need to pay attention to the reality of amateur
copyright production. If, instead, the goals of amateurs are ignored
and copyright increasingly acts as a barrier to their efforts,
copyright will succeed in disabling the public access to information
that it was originally designed to encourage.
It is therefore worthwhile to consider here the normative
implications of amateurization for copyright law. The most impor-
tant lesson, we think, is that the incentives story of copyright is in
need of adjustment. To explain how this is so, we will need to briefly
explain the theoretical problem that required the solution of
"copyright as incentive" and then explain how this solution is
problematic.
A copyright grant is the grant of a property-like interest,
conferring state protection against the use of information. Property's
traditional subjects have been spatial zones, in the case of real
property, or physical objects, in the case of personalty. 54 Property
254. The owner and the market set the ostensible price, but the state, of course, sets the
ground rules that determine what price the market and owner can set. Consider two property
systems governing exactly the same property, the first system granting the owner exclusive
property rights forever and the second system granting the same rights for a week. Holding
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rules essentially require that those who fail to negotiate effectively
with owners of these spaces and things refrain from entering or
using them. It is generally believed that the existence of legal
property interests require some explanation because society does
not generally restrict personal freedoms for the sake of private
benefit of individuals without some justification. 5 In order to
subsidize the creation and enforcement of private legal rights, we
imagine, society should guarantee that we are all better off by
respecting individual private property rights.
In the case of intellectual property, the need for some animating
justification is more evident because the owner of a copyright is not
physically or financially harmed when a pattern of information is
replicated." 6 If a child occupies and barricades Disney's corporate
boardrooms or shoplifts a Mickey Mouse doll from the Disney store,
Disney obviously loses some rights to access the physical and
tangible things in which it has rights of ownership. If a child
willfully draws Mickey Mouse, however, the statutory damages
resulting from this act cannot be linked to some real loss suffered by
Disney." 7 Copyright, as Tom Bell has noted, could constructively be
cast as a form of state-sponsored welfare, in which the public is
taxed for the benefit of copyright owners.25
People don't like to be taxed without explanation, and two
normative justifications are generally offered for the imposition of
the social tax that is copyright."' First, Locke's labor/dessert theory
all other variables equal, we can expect the price for the transfer of the property under the
second system to be less than under the first.
255. If we begin with the liberal base assumption that people should be free to do anything
that is consistent with every other person's freedom, then grants of property interests
generate constraints on freedoms and require justification. See Jeremy Waldron, Property
Law, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 3, 8-10 (Dennis Patterson
ed., 2000).
256. Tom Bell, Authors' Welfare: Copyright as a Statutory Mechanism for Redistributing
Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 238-39 (2003); Boyle, supra note 11, at 37, 42; Gordon, supra
note 189, at 159; Heverly, supra note 20, at 1151-52 (noting that everyone agrees that
information is a public good, but the debate is over the implications of this fact for law); Ku,
supra note 95, at 263-64 (arguing that digital technology could destroy the balance of public
goods and private interest).
257. In other words, the harm suffered by copyright holders in this case is to a statutory
entitlement interest. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts,
Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 541 (2003).
258. Bell, supra note 256, at 273-75.
259. A third justification exists, based on Hegel's conception of property as an extension
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provides a fundamental justification for all property systems, not
just copyright, by suggesting that one should be granted a property
interest in anything which results as the consequence of one's own
labor." ° Though this justification is commonly invoked by copyright
holders--"it's unfair to deny us the fruits of our labors"261-and even
suffuses the rhetoric of many court opinions, the consensus is that
according to the Constitution and the theory of copyright in the
United States, this is not the main normative justification of
copyright.
Instead, the dominant theory in this country is that copyright
serves an instrumental or utilitarian purpose."2 This is the
incentive story of copyright. Copyright, it tells us, is an incentive for
the production of new works. Jane Ginsburg has recently blamed
the current "bad name" of copyright on the greed of copyright
holders and consumers.263 Greed is surely the root of all evil,
however, it is a major player in the incentive story of copyright. If
copyright is indeed an incentive to new productions, then the law of
copyright is essentially a law that says that greed is good.2" Society
of personality. See HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1967) (1821); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 330-54
(1988); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). This
justification seems to be rarely invoked, however, perhaps because it is somewhat
controversial within property law generally, and hard to reconcile with large-scale corporate
ownership of intellectual property. For an account of the differing justifications of intellectual
property, see generally Hughes, supra.
260. "Whatsoever [man] removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in,
he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his property." JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 26 (Rod Hay ed.,
1988) (1690).
261. See id. § 27; PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY 11 (1994) ("Bubbling beneath
all [intellectual property] ... is the intuition that people should be able to hold on to the value
of what they create, to reap where they have sown."); STEPHEN R. MuNZER, A THEORY OF
PROPERTY 38 (1990); F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92
CAL. L. REV. 1, 46 (briefly summarizing Lockean property theory); Nimmer, supra note 27, at
135.
262. See Ku, supra note 95, at 293; Liu, supra note 3, at 397 (stating the animating theory
of copyright is that "It]he author of a copyrighted work is an individual who is motivated to
create primarily by the hope or anticipation of economic gain"); Nimmer, supra note 27, at
136, 138-39.
263. See Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name, supra note 77.
264. Of course, sharing is arguably better than being greedy, but to argue this in a legal
setting one must counter strong presumptions that sharing is both economically foolish and
rare. See Yochai Benkler, "Sharing Nicely'" On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2004); Michael J.
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grants the greedy artist-entrepreneur legal rights in new informa-
tion in order to benefit society.2  It should be no surprise, therefore,
that to those outside the copyright industry, the industries seem to
have an unseemly and single-minded interest in "biggering" their
revenues.266 Such biggering, in the realm of information properties,
is generally developed by periodically obtaining stronger and longer-
lasting state entitlements. This has clearly been the history of
copyright law's scope since the seventeenth century. The duration
of copyright protection has steadily expanded, with little explana-
tion of why this expansion was needed. In the United States in
1790, a 28-year term was the originally enacted duration (14 years
plus a 14-year renewal term).267 This was extended to 42 years in
1831 (28-year initial term plus a 14-year extension).2" Then in 1909,
a 56-year term was enacted (28 years plus a 28-year extension).
269
In 1976, the term became the life of the author plus 50 years.270
Most recently, the Copyright Term Extension Act added another 20
years to the term. 7 1 The most recent extension of copyright
protection must have played some part in promoting new fixations
of information. Yet the social need for an abundance of works is
rarely pitted against any countervailing consideration. The public
Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1529 (2004)
(noting that sharing is "an empty concept when considered in isolation").
265. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989); Liu, supra note 3, at 397.
266. DR. SUESS, THE LORAX (1971) (using the term "biggering" describing factory growth
that eventually damaged the environment); see also James Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish?
Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV.
2007, 2019 (2000). The results of copyright's biggering have, somewhat oddly, led to demands
for greater biggering. Typical press releases from the copyright industries state how many
billions of dollars are generated by copyright entitlements or reportedly "lost" to copyright
infringement. Using such entitlement-based figures in support of arguments for greater
entitlements is strange, if one analogizes copyright to social welfare for authors. Tom W. Bell,
Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in CoPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1 (Adam Thierer & Wayne Crews eds.,
2002).
267. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1; LESSIG, supra note 62, at 133-35; Victoria A.
Grzelak, Mickey Mouse & Sonny Bono Go to Court: The Copyright Term Extension Act and Its
Effect on Current and Future Rights, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 95, 99-101 (2002).
268. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436 (1831).
269. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
270. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1998).
271. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified as amended 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203, 301-04) [hereinafter CTEA].
[Vol. 46:9511022
AMATEUR-TO-AMATEUR
domain does not have the instinctive public appeal possessed by
Barbaloots and Truffala Trees.272
Yet while the incentive story may be somewhat true, it is equally
true that in the case of many works, authors write, paint, and
perform without much thought of financial reward. Indeed, if one
were to consider the general animating goals of average artists and
authors, they probably do not seek to become rich by preventing
others from gaining access to their creative products. Instead, they
probably seek an opposite goal-attaining fame through the
maximal social access to their work. The fantasy that motivates
most authorship is just as likely a fantasy of reputation as it is one
of lucre. Playing Carnegie Hall, illustrating the cover of a great
magazine, or winning a prestigious literary prize or award all
primarily entail the author's creative work being seen and heard by
a great number of people, but these results do not necessarily entail
riches.273 Copyright's main social function is actually to prevent
works from being widely and freely distributed, and thus it entails
a trade-off of lesser distribution (and the associated decrease in
reputation), for financial reward.
It is not always certain that creative artists will benefit from
copyright entitlements even when their works are extremely
popular. Many artists ultimately lack possession of the legal rights
that copyright ownership grants. This is due to the fact that our
system assumes that copyright interests are economic interests, and
correspondingly freely transferable.274 When alienable property
272. Litman, supra note 97, at 344. Litman doesn't mention THE LORAX, but we use it by
way of tribute to James Boyle's suggestion of borrowing environmental themes in scholarship
advocating the importance of a vital public domain. See, e.g., James Boyle, A Politics of
Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 108-12 (1997); see also
Boyle, supra note 11, at 70-74. "What is true for the environment is ... true for the public
domain and the commons." Id. at 73.
273. See Steve Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights, 9
FORDHAM INTELL PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301, 316, 323 (1998) (exploring alternative
incentive models); Geller, supra note 1, at 238 (noting the "different stakes for different
players"); Gordon, supra note 189, at 191 (questioning whether financial incentives, in some
cases, may be counter-productive); Ku, supra note 95, at 308-09; Litman, supra note 56, at 248
(describing a situation in which Litman suggested to a second-year law student that he
publish, for money, some scholarship in the area of copyright law-he decided against it, and
that scholarship is now made available for free to Litman's students); Nadel, supra note 86,
at 811-17.
274. The Continental system of droit moral is slightly different and serves two policy ends,
protecting the artist's personality and preserving art for posterity. See JOHN HENRY
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interests are thrown to markets, they inevitably end up being
managed by specialists in biggering. Professional exploiters have
traditionally gathered and marketed the most popular works.
Original creators, as many have observed, are comparatively naive
and relatively disempowered and often feel ultimately cheated by
the industry players. A number of high profile cases over the last
ten years such as George Michael's battle with Sony,27 Courtney
Love's searing attack on her record label,276 and Prince Roger
Nelson's renuciation of his Warner Brother's-controlled name to
become 'The Artist Formerly Known As Prince," '77 all recount the
story of successful artists who, as a step to obtaining fame, contrac-
tually alienated their creative work to corporate appropriators and
promoters only later to renounce their Faustian bargains.
None of this is to argue that copyright does not motivate the
creation and dissemination of new works. It clearly motivates the
collective efforts of vertically integrated industries which own vast
content libraries and are prominent proponents of copyright
legislation before Congress.27 Yet the financial rewards of copyright
over the past century have primarily inured to these publishers and
distributors, while individual authors have had mixed experi-
ences.27s Despite this, myths of copyright persist as courts repeat-
MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAw, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 307-10 (4th ed. 2002).
There is often a conception that this approach embodies human rights as a consequence of the
first policy aim. Though economic rights are the central pillar of the United States copyright
system, some importation of the droit moral occurred by virtue of the U.S. ratification of the
Berne Convention, which demands recognition of the droit moral. The U.S. response is largely
confined to the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (codified
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
275. See BBC News, George Michael Goes Back to Sony (Nov. 17, 2003), at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/l/hi/entertainment/music/3278909.stm.
276. Courtney Love, Courtney Love Does the Math, SALON.COM (accusing the music labels
of "piracy" and worse), at http://dir.salon.comltech/ feature/2000/06/14/love/index.html (June
14, 2000).
277. Wikipedia, Prince (artist), at http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilPrince_(artist) (last visited
on Aug. 30, 2004). For an account of the relationship between artists and the music industry
in light of the Internet, see Christina Saraceno, RIAA Faces Bigger Battles Ahead, ROLLING
STONE, Aug. 4, 2000, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/newsarticle.asp?nid =
11434.
278. See Gordon, supra note 189, at 192 (stating that copyright's financial incentives
primarily motivate those who do not create).
279. See Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name, supra note 77, at 61-62
(acknowledging that copyright owners are not perceived the same as copyright authors).
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edly assert a simple story about copyright as an incentive to
authorial creativity.2 °
Obviously, amateur production further complicates the story of
incentives. By definition, amateurs operate outside the commercial
production chains of the copyright industry. They create and
distribute works for a variety of reasons beyond traditional eco-
nomic incentives."s Amateur creation has always been the rule in
scholarly publishing, where most publication is unpaid and scholars
care most about ensuring that someone reads their work. It turns
out that this type of motivation arises in fiction, music, art,
programming, and in every creative endeavor. There has always
been a majority of unpublished and unrecognized artists, but until
recently it has simply been too expensive for these artists to make
the wider world aware of their creativity. Authors may now bypass
the traditional copyright chains of the entertainment industry. The
Creative Commons has recently made this obvious by procuring
permissive distribution licenses for over a million pieces of copyright
content.28 2
This increasing profusion of amateur content suggests that while
copyright clearly plays a role in the balance sheets of the MPAA and
the RIAA, people will continue to create content in the absence of
copyright, and the Internet will continue to provide a means to
distribute these works. As Eben Moglen declared several years ago
in his corollary to Faraday's Law: "If you wrap the Internet around
every brain on the planet, knowledge flows in the network."2" One
can predict that the importance of copyright as an incentive will
280. See Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. Prrr. L. REv. 235, 237-42 (1991)
(describing the "prevailing public myth of copyright" and contrasting it with the practical
realities of authorship).
281. See Boyle, supra note 11, at 46 (noting that this type of creation occurs and stating
"[ilt just does not matter why they do it"); Geller, supra note 1, at 258 ("It is hard to imagine
thatthe prospects of copyright-secured gain motivated Emily Dickinson to write her poetry
* or Van Gogh to paint.").
282. See Creative Commons Catalog (noting the "one million objects" figure), at
http://commoncontent.org/. The figures in the catalog clearly under-report the actual numbers
of Creative Commons licensed content, since many works are released under a Creative
Commons license but are not reported to the Creative Commons catalog.
. 283. See Professor Eben Moglen, Remarks at AALS Mini-Workshop on the Internet and
Legal Scholarship (Jan. 5, 1995), at http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my-pubs/nospeech.html.
Moglen continued: "Resistance, according to Moglen's Corollary to Ohm's Law, is directly
proportional to the field strength of the intellectual property system." Id.
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become increasingly irrelevant as amateur creation proliferates
due to cheap recording tools, high bandwidth connections, and
distributed networks.
The normative conclusion here is fairly obvious. Copyright's
processes are relevant primarily to centralized copyright industries
and to some small professional subset of those who create new
works. For amateurs, however, it isn't clear that copyright law is
very important at all. Based on this shift, one might argue that the
balance of incentives and access needs to be recalculated because
more can be produced with lesser incentives. This suggestion has
been made before, however, and no one in Congress seems to see
any basis for lessening copyright incentives.2 Legal scholars may
be in almost uniform agreement that copyright law today is
overbroad, overcomplicated, and insufficiently solicitous of public
interests.8 5 Yet the pronouncements of legal scholars have generally
not set the course of Congress or the Copyright Office. Instead,
copyleft scholars have been required to man the barricades of
legislation and litigation.2"
The downside of fighting wars against organized copyright
holders is that one must begin to envision copyright as exclusively
a matter of struggles between copyright owners and a public full of
consumers. The battles of fair use are vitally important, but they
take place against a great epochal shift in information practices
that should also be tremendously important in how we think about
copyright law. Yochai Benkler has suggested that the new
economics of amateur and distributed production provide us with.
the opportunity to realize political liberty and cultural autonomy."7
There are, by now, numerous examples of popular amateur
creativity that allow us to conclude that decentralized organizations
can compete with traditional firms in the production of complex
creative objects.
In essence, our social policy with regard to information and
expressive content is dividing into two spheres: the obvious and the
hidden. The obvious sphere is a traditional, copyright-driven sphere
284. See Litman, supra note 280, at 344.
285. See generally JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001); LESSIG, supra note 62;
Boyle, supra note 272.
286. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 101.
287. Benkler, Freedom in the Commons, supra note 11, at 1249.
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of professional information practices. This is the field almost
exclusively affected by litigation and legislation, and the one we
hear about each time the RIAA sues another file-sharer. The second
sphere, which creates essentially the same type of content, is a
distributed, amateur-to-amateur sphere of information practices not
committed to copyright's social structures.
The two spheres, unfortunately, cannot co-exist peacefully.
Participants in the first sphere have financial incentives to ensure
that the second-sphere amateurs do not threaten their profits.
Copyright professionals are experiencing real difficulties in
competing with amateur production.2 Microsoft clearly does not
want Linux to succeed. The music industries would clearly not like
the competition provided by amateur peer-to-peer music networks
even if their copyrights were not at risk. The major broadcast news
media have yet to proclaim that weblogs can constitute a form of
journalism. The amateur sphere, by definition decentralized and
underfunded, is not well organized to respond to the conspiracy of
professionals. Even when amateur superstars emerge, they are
always free to cash out and become professionals.
Neither sphere, therefore, can win the struggle. The professionals
will clearly continue to dominate the production and exploitation
of copyright stars. Another Britney Spears will emerge from
corporate investments of time, money, payola, and pandering.
Disney will fight for the Mouse. At the margins, however, the
influence of copyright will slip as blogs, digitally-edited movies,
music, cartoons, and so on, continue to be produced and distributed
by amateurs who are not motivated by copyright or impeded by
copyright's market system in their efforts to reach a broader public.
The core conflict between the two spheres will not rest on any
particular issue of copyright law but instead upon the matter of
copyright law's relevance to the big shift in content practices.289
Indeed, there will be an increasing blurring of the two spheres, as
aspiring amateurs see copyright as a tool that might be used or
discarded. Some authors are finding practical ways to combine the
new benefits of amateur-to-amateur distribution with the standard
288. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary
Software, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 265, 268-73 (2004).
289. See generally Schlachter, supra note 105,' at 17 (claiming that when it is all said and
done, "copyright law may be unimportant to the Internet").
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benefits granted by traditional copyright. For instance, blogger and
science-fiction writer Cory Doctorow recently published his first
book, Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom, in the usual way, first
in hardcover and then a year later in paperback.29 ° Concurrently,
however, he convinced the publisher to allow him to release the
book onto the Internet in a freely-available PDF form, and he
encouraged the free and widespread dissemination of the book.291
Various readers made all sorts of creative uses of the text, cutting
it up into chunks and emailing them to friends-one chunk per day,
or replacing all words beginning with "S" and "M" with "sausage"
and "mash," respectively.292 Doctorow's experiment fared well. Not
only did he make money from royalties on the published version, but
he also garnered a great deal of public exposure through the
process. His experiment also convinced others, most notably Larry
Lessig and his publisher, Penguin Books, to release books in the
same way.293 At the time of writing, Lessig's book is in its third
hardcopy printing, even though the free version has been down-
loaded 180,000 times.294
The lesson we draw from this is both modest and outlandish. It is
possible that centralized intermediaries can operate side-by-side
with amateurs, and both can profit from the experience. Of course,
this is not the way that copyright incumbents have generally
reacted over the last twenty years. There is a chance, however, that
they might recognize the opportunities presented to them by the
amateur-to-amateur movement.
There is a great temptation now to make grand normative
pronouncements about how we should balance the two spheres. It
is too early, however, to say how the spheres will intersect, and how
290. Cory Doctorow, blog entry, at http:llwww.craphound.com/down/archives/2003_11.
php#000111 (Nov. 26, 2003).
291. Cory Doctorow, blog entry, at http://www.craphound.com/down/archives/2003_01.
php#000018 (Jan. 9, 2003).
292. See http://www.craphound.com/downlarchives/2004_O3.php#000121. A similar process
is happening with Larry Lessig's FREE CULTURE (2004), released under a similar license.
Within a few days of its release, plans emerged to have bloggers record and release audio
readings of the book in MP3 format. See Akma, blog entry, at http://akma.disseminary.org/
archives/001253.html.
293. See LESSIG, supra note 62.
294. See Give It Away and Theyl Buy It, STAN. MAG., July/August 2004, available at




content industries will react to the new opportunities of the
amateur-to-amateur world. We will therefore resist the temptation
and conclude with our fundamental point, but played in a minor
key. The big shift to amateurisation in content promises vast
potential in people's ability to express themselves and in the social
benefits that flow from a vast new corpus of amateur content. It
would be a tremendous shame if we failed to recognize the opportu-
nity of amateur content and continued to assume that the protection
of copyright industries was the only way to guarantee the produc-
tion of valuable cultural expression.
IV. AMATEUR-TO-AMATEUR
"Rome did not 'fall,' it was transformed. 295
Rome was once the center of the world. What we think of as the
fall of its empire was, Peter Brown reminds us, just the transfer of
its influence into a different world, one that in time we have come
to think of as Europe. It is meaningless to ask whether the unitary
might of imperial Rome was preferable to the distributed, messy
agglomeration of tribes and states that eventually emerged after
Rome fell. It was not better, just different.
It is not surprising that those within the copyright industries see
the death of their existing business models as the end of culture.
Imperial Romans saw the disappearance of empire as the end of all
civilization. They could not conceive that another, more interesting
order might rise in its place. However, instead of Empire we saw
empires; instead of Rome we saw the emergence of many different
cultures, peoples, and states.
A similar process is happening in the world of creative content.
Instead of a unitary system called copyright governing our informa-
tion practices, we are witnessing the emergence of a distributed,
messy agglomeration of opportunities in content creation, produc-
tion, distribution, and so on. The movement which we characterize
as "amateur-to-amateur" will inevitably mean that copyright's
295. George L. Gorse, City Ritual as a Key to Interpreting Renaissance Genoa (citing PETER
BROWN, THE CULT OF THE SAINTS: ITS RISE AND FUNCTION IN LATIN CHRISTIANITY (1981)), at
http://www.icomos.orglusicomos/symposium/SYMP98/genoa.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2004).
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empire-the central, all-encompassing structure for the develop-
ment of content--will decline and fall. New tribes of amateurs will
emerge and become significant forces in cultural content. This does
not, however, signal the end of copyright altogether. Just as the
Roman Empire became modern-day Italy, copyright will transform
into something else. Just as Italy reflects ancient Rome, copyright
will reflect its imperial heritage.
But it will no longer be Rome: all-encompassing, all-powerful, all-
important.
